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Abstract  
 
There are situations in which competitors ally to pursue a common objective.  
This simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition is called coopetition and we 
study it theoretically and experimentally in a group contest setup.  
More concretely, we analyze a group contest with a new sharing rule, that we call inverse 
proportional. This rule embodies the idea that the more a member of a group contributes to 
win the contest, the less this member is able to capture the potential posterior prize, 
introducing thus a competitive element into group decision-making. We compare the effects 
of this rule with a standard, the egalitarian sharing rule. While in the egalitarian case 
theoretically the optimal individual contribution is positive, with the inverse proportional 
rule zero contribution represents the individual (and also the social) optimum. We find that 
participants in our experiment contribute more with the egalitarian than with the inverse 
proportional rule. We also document over-expenditure with the inverse proportional sharing 
rule, suggesting that group contest generates inefficient behavior even when individuals are 
extremely penalized for their contributions. We also explore the drivers of decision in the 
group contest, and find that contribution in a public goods game is positively associated with 
contribution in the group contest and that competitiveness explains part of the behavior with 
the inverse proportional rule but not with the egalitarian sharing. Neither social value 
orientation, risk attitudes, nor personal traits appear as significant predictors of behavior. 
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Koopetíció csoportos versenyben 
 
Kiss Hubert János - Alfonso Rosa-Garcia - Vita Zhukova 
 
Összefoglaló  
 
 
Vannak olyan helyzetek, amelyekben versenytársak összefognak egy közös cél érdekében.  
Az együttműködés és a verseny egyidejű jelenlétét koopetíciónak hívják. Mi ezt a jelenséget 
tanulmányozzuk elméletileg és egy kísérlet segítségével csoportos versenykörnyezetben. 
Pontosabban, csoportos versenyt elemzünk egy új felosztási szabály jelenlétében, amit 
fordítottan arányosnak nevezünk. Ez a szabály azt az ötletet testesíti meg, hogy minél többel 
járul hozzá egy csoporttag a verseny megnyeréséhez, annál kisebb szeletet képes 
megkaparintani a potenciálisan elnyerhető díjból. Összehasonlítjuk ezen szabály hatását a 
standard egyenlő felosztási szabállyal. Míg az egyenlő felosztás mellett elméletileg az egyéni 
optimum pozitív hozzájárulási szinttel jár együtt, a fordítottan arányos felosztás mellett a 
zéró hozzájárulás az egyéni (és egyben a társadalmi) optimum. Azt találjuk, hogy a 
kísérletben a résztvevők valóban magasabb hozzájárulásokat tesznek az egyenlő felosztás 
mellett. Azt is látjuk, hogy a fordítottan arányos felosztás mellett is megfigyelhető a 
túlköltekezés (over-expenditure) jelensége, azt sugallva, hogy a csoportos verseny még akkor 
sem vezet hatékony viselkedésre, ha az egyéneknek nagyon nem éri meg pozitív 
hozzájárulásokat tenni. A csoportos versenyben hozott döntések mozgatóira is kíváncsiak 
vagyunk és azt találjuk, hogy a közjószág-játékban tett hozzájárulások pozitívan korrelálnak a 
csoportos versenyben tett hozzájárulásokkal, továbbá a versengési hajlamnak is van 
magyarázó ereje, azonban csak a fordítottan arányos felosztás mellett. Sem a társas érték 
szerinti orientáció (social value orientation), sem a kockázati attitűdök, sem egyéb 
személyiségjegyek nem magyarázzák számottevő mértékben a döntéseket. 
Tárgyszavak: csoportos verseny, egyenlő felosztás, fordítottan arányos felosztás, 
kockázati attitűdök, közjószág-játék, társas érték szerinti orientáció, versengési hajlam. 
JEL kódok: C72, C92, D70; D72, H41 
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Abstract
There are situations in which competitors ally to pursue a common objective.
This simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition is called coope-
tition and we study it theoretically and experimentally in a group contest
setup. More concretely, we analyze a group contest with a new sharing rule,
that we call inverse proportional. This rule embodies the idea that the more
a member of a group contributes to win the contest, the less this member
is able to capture the potential posterior prize, introducing thus a competi-
tive element into group decision-making. We compare the effects of this rule
with a standard, the egalitarian sharing rule. While in the egalitarian case
theoretically the optimal individual contribution is positive, with the inverse
proportional rule zero contribution represents the individual (and also the so-
cial) optimum. We find that participants in our experiment contribute more
with the egalitarian than with the inverse proportional rule. We also docu-
ment over-expenditure with the inverse proportional sharing rule, suggesting
that group contest generates inefficient behavior even when individuals are
extremely penalized for their contributions. We also explore the drivers of
decision in the group contest, and find that contribution in a public goods
game is positively associated with contribution in the group contest and that
competitiveness explains part of the behavior with the inverse proportional
rule but not with the egalitarian sharing. Neither social value orientation,
risk attitudes, nor personal traits appear as significant predictors of behavior.
Keywords: competitiveness, egalitarian sharing rule, group contest, inverse
proportional sharing rule, public goods game, risk attitudes, social value
orientation
JEL: code, C72, C92, D70, D72, H41
1. Introduction
Group contests are pervasive, including rent-seeking and lobbying, inno-
vation tournaments and R&D races or sports competitions. A recent liter-
ature investigates the nature of cooperation among the group members in
these contests. However, in many of these situations, members of groups are
not just cooperating in order to achieve the common goal, but they are indeed
competitors with opposite interests, once the prize is obtained. Cooperation
and competition are two of the most studied phenomena in Economics and
in many occasions both are present simultaneously, a situation termed as
coopetition. In this work, we study for the first time coopetition in the
group contest setup.
Consider two examples of coopetition in group contest. In cycling races,
in many cases two or more cyclist break away from the peloton. To maintain
their distance to the following peloton the cyclists who escaped have to coop-
erate, meaning that all of them have to be in front and pull (that is, to take
the lead) that requires a lot of effort as the leader has to struggle more with
air resistance than the followers who are sheltered from wind.1 On the other
hand, these cyclists also compete because each of them wants to win the com-
petition and arrive first at the finish line. To win, they need to economize on
efforts so they are interested in less cooperation (that is, less pulling). The
more cooperative a cyclist is, the more likely it is that the escape is successful
and they arrive first to the finish line, but at the same time more cooperation
decreases his chance of winning the race. As a second example, consider a
set of firms, that cooperate in R&D to develop some technology, but then
compete for customers. The high-definition optical disc format competition
is a suitable illustration. As HDTV televisions became popular in the mid-
2000s, a need emerged for an inexpensive storage medium capable of holding
large amounts of data for HD video. Nine leading electronic companies (e.g.
Sony, Panasonic, Samsung) founded Blu-ray Disc Association, an industry
consortium with the aim of developing and licensing Blu-ray Disc technology
and promoting business opportunities for this standard. A similar associa-
1Aerodynamic drag can be reduced up to 50% for cyclist that are not in front (see
Blocken et al., 2018, and references therein).
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tion arose led by Toshiba (that, for instance, included Sanyo) and which was
also supported by Microsoft to promote a competing format called HD DVD.
Members of both associations cooperated in the development of the format
(the prize being that the format becomes the accepted standard to be used
all over the world), but then competed to sell players compatible with the
given format to customers. Firms in such consortia dedicate part of their own
resources to the development of the standard while they still have to com-
pete for customers against their allies in the consortium. These firms face
therefore a trade-off between using their resources to increase the probability
of winning the format war or to increase the probability of capturing a larger
share of the market. These situations where competitors cooperate to de-
feat another group of competitors are also present for instance in the case of
chambers of commerce and federations of entrepreneurs or enterprises, where
firms that cooperate to pursue a common goal are possibly competing for the
same customers. Schemes of protected designation of origin which promote
and protect names of quality agricultural products of a given region are also
examples of coopetition. For instance, producers of gorgonzola or prosciutto
cooperate to make the special produce attractive to as many customers as
possible, but then the individual producers compete to serve the increased
market that has been generated through the cooperation.
All these situations have the common characteristic that a cooperative
behavior is needed to achieve a goal as a group but at the same time it lowers
the resources / capacity to compete. We explore behavior in these coopetitive
environments using the well-studied group contest setup. In group contests
several groups compete to obtain a prize. To put simply, the group whose
members make the most effort has the greatest probability to win the prize.
In the extant literature on group contest, the prize is typically split up either
with an egalitarian (everybody in the winning group receiving the same share
of the prize) or with a proportional (members of the winner group receiving
a share that is proportional to their contribution to the group effort) rule. In
this paper, we introduce a new sharing rule that we term inverse proportional,
expressing the idea that the less a member of the winning group contributed
to the group effort to win the prize, the (proportionally) higher share she
receives from the prize. Inverse proportionality captures the trade off faced
in coopetitive setups: the more an agent spends on cooperation, the less
resource she has to obtain a higher share from the prize (if her group wins
it). Note that competition is present at two levels. At the group level, each
member of the group is interested in defeating the other group, hence in a
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high overall effort, while at the individual level, each individual is interested
in capturing a higher share of the prize, hence in a low individual effort. In
our previous examples, cyclists in the leading group are interested that there
is always somebody who takes the lead and pulls to maintain the distance to
the peloton, while the group of firms favouring a special format is interested to
make it dominant in the market, but at the same time cyclists and firms want
to defeat also the other members of their group by economizing resources
spent on cooperation.2
The group contest literature has consistently found overexpenditure in
these situations. In particular, it has been found that under the egalitarian
rule individuals contribute much more than the positive contribution that the
Nash equilibrium of the game predicts. Even though a declining pattern of
contributions is observed when the game is repeated, even after several repe-
titions over-expenditure persists. It suggests that the group contest structure
generates this over-expenditure. To test if this is the case, we study how the
inverse sharing rule affects behavior. The theoretical analysis of group contest
with an inverse proportional sharing rule shows that individuals maximize
their payoff making a zero contribution to the group performance. Moreover,
zero contribution is also the social optimum. This is a strong prediction that
we test in the laboratory, analyzing both if this different sharing rule has
an effect on contribution as well as if over-expenditure remains even in the
extreme case where zero contribution is always optimal from an individual
point of view. In two sessions, both with 14 four-member groups, we in-
vestigate behavior in group contest with egalitarian and inverse proportional
sharing rule. Moreover, after the group contest we have the participants play
additional games to measure their social attitude, risk preferences, coopera-
tiveness and competitiveness, as well as an extensive questionnaire capturing
personal traits. Our aim with these games and tasks is to better understand
what drives choices in the group contest, and well as what drives differences
in behaviors between cooperative and coopetitive environments.
We find a sizable and significant difference in efforts, contributions being
much lower under the inverse proportional rule, as expected. We also report
over-expenditure with the inverse sharing rule, although zero contribution is
2Bouncken et al. (2015) claim that ”While coopetition may combine the best of both
worlds of cooperation and competition, there is still an inherent paradox, given the possible
tension between value creation and capture.” Our sharing rules represent different degrees
of this inherent tension.
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always individually optimal. When relating behavior in contest with other
situations, we find that contributions in a public good game are positively
associated with contribution in the contest, independently of the sharing rule.
Competitiveness, measured a´ la Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) explains part
of the behavior in the coopetitive environment, but not in the cooperative
one. Finally, we do not find any effect of neither social value orientation,
risk aversion nor personality traits which seem to have no role in explaining
behavior in these environments.
1.1. Literature review
In this section, first we briefly speak about the coopetition literature in
management, then we review the main findings of the group contest litera-
ture that is related to our theoretical predictions and the role of members’
heterogeneity in contribution in the framework of group contests.3
1.1.1. Coopetition in management
There is a vast literature in management on coopetition, so we briefly
review the main findings that are related to our paper.4 In the management
literature, coopetition has been described and analyzed in many industries
and services, such as petrochemicals (e.g. Tsai, 2002), retailing (e.g. Kotzab
and Teller, 2003; Martinelli and Sparks, 2003), maritime logistics (e.g. Song
and Lee, 2012), engineering and technology (e.g. Carayannis and Alexander,
2001; Carf`ı and Schiliro`, 2012; Chin et al., 2008; Gnyawali and Park, 2009;
Gueguen, 2009; Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Velasco, 2004; Shih et al.,
2006; Salvetat and Ge´raudel, 2012), transportation (e.g. Gwynne, 2009; Lin
et al., 2017), finance and insurance (e.g. Czakon et al., 2009; Okura, 2007),
tourism (e.g. von Friedrichs Gra¨ngsjo¨, 2003; Wang and Krakover, 2008),
health care (e.g. Peng and Bourne, 2009).
Bouncken et al. (2015) lists the following motives to pursue coopetition:
to gain market power (e.g. Gnyawali and Park, 2011; Ritala et al., 2009;
Rusko, 2011), to foster innovation (Brolos, 2009; Ritala and Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen, 2009), to promote supply chains (e.g. Bakshi and Kleindorfer,
2009; Wilhelm and Kohlbacher, 2011) and as a strategy in global competition
(e.g. Luo, 2007; Gnyawali and Park, 2011). Therefore, these motives can be
3Henceforth, we use effort and contribution in an interchangeable manner.
4Bengtsson and Kock (2014); Bouncken et al. (2015); Dorn et al. (2016); Walley (2007)
are good surveys about this literature.
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seen as the goals of the group. The benefit of coopetition may be win-
win situations in which the parties involved end up with lower costs. Dorn
et al. (2016) find that coopetition is more likely to arise in industries that
are at a very early or mature stage of the market lifecycle. The major risk
of coopetition according to this literature is opportunistic behavior Levy
et al. (2003); Baumard et al. (2009); Bouncken and Kraus (2013); Pellegrin-
Boucher et al. (2013); Cassiman et al. (2009).
Related to the benefits and risks of coopetition, a recurring topic in the
management literature on coopetition is the inherent tension between coop-
eration and competiton. The first one requires a friendly mindset, while the
latter provokes a hostile attitude, two strongly opposing logics (e.g. Bello
et al., 2010; Bunge, 1989; Das and Teng, 2000). Many studies emphasize the
importance of balancing competition and cooperation (e.g. Bengtsson and
Kock, 2000; Cassiman et al., 2009; Das and Teng, 2000; Osarenkhoe, 2010),
but little is known on how an optimal balance can be achieved. Park et al.
(2014) find that moderately high competition and high cooperation repre-
sents an optimal coopetition balance. Our findings clearly suggest that our
setup with the inverse proportional sharing rule generates too much compe-
tition that leads to a lower cooperation level than the egalitarian rule.
The management literature distinguishes different levels of coopetition.
Thus, coopetition may take place on the individual level (e.g. Enberg, 2012),
within the firm (for instance Tsai, 2002; Luo et al., 2006) or on a team level
(e.g. Baruch and Lin, 2012; Ghobadi and D’Ambra, 2012), between firms
(for example Bouncken and Kraus, 2013; Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-
Velasco, 2004) or on a network level (e.g. Peng and Bourne, 2009; Mantena
and Saha, 2012). Note that our motivating examples and the idea behind
our study is a combination of the different levels. It is not simply that
groups compete and cooperate at the same time, but there is also a within-
group competition going on. Combining intrafirm coopetition with interfirm
competition would yield such a scenario, but we are not aware of any analysis
that investigates such a setup.
Related to the management literature on coopetition, using classic exper-
imental games Devetag (2009) studies how coordination and trust may affect
coopetitive processes, while Rossi and Warglien (2009) investigate how fair-
ness and reciprocity determine coopetition in a firm. Lacomba et al. (2011)
study experimentally coopetition on the individual level, using the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma game. Thus, there is some experimental work on coope-
tition, but they do not study on a group level and use different games.
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1.1.2. Over-expenditure of effort
A general finding in the group contest literature both in the field (e.g.
Erev et al., 1993) and in the laboratory (e.g. Nalbantian and Schotter,
1997; Van Dijk et al., 2001) is that with proportional or egalitarian sharing
rule contests between groups lead to high individual effort and little free-
riding. More recent experimental studies (Abbink et al., 2010; Ahn et al.,
2011; Cason et al., 2012, 2017; Leibbrandt and Sa¨a¨ksvuori, 2012; Ke et al.,
2013, 2015; Eisenkopf, 2014; Sheremeta, 2011; Brookins et al., 2015; Bhat-
tacharya, 2016; Chowdhury et al., 2016) also consistently find that average
effort level (though often showing a declining pattern) is significantly higher
than the equilibirum prediction. Sheremeta (2013) reports based on 30 stud-
ies that the median over-expenditure is 72%. Several explanations for the
over-expenditure of effort have been proposed. Sheremeta (2010); Price and
Sheremeta (2011, 2015); Cason et al. (2018) show that the pure joy of win-
ning may explain part of the over-expenditure. Bounded rationality (Falluc-
chi et al., 2013; Chowdhury et al., 2014; Lim et al., 2014) and relative payoff
maximization (Mago et al., 2016) also have some explanatory power when
we try to understand over-expenditure. Sheremeta (2018a) shows that indi-
vidual characteristics (impulsiveness and cognitive abilities) may also affect
expenditure on effort.
A different set of explanations involve social preferences. More concretely,
in social dilemma and collective action games, participants often contribute
more to the public account than predicted by standard game theory based on
the idea of homo economicus, (see, for instance Chaudhuri, 2011). Theories
based on social preferences like altruism (e.g. Andreoni, 1990), fairness (e.g.
Rabin, 1993) or inequality aversion (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000) offer potential explanation for such behavior and it is natural
to think that such social preferences may be at work towards other members
of the group.5 Relatedly, social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979)
that proposes that a strong group identity may blur the differences between
individual and group interests is another potential explanation. Chowdhury
et al. (2016) provides experimental evidence that social identity is in fact
5A related explanation (called parochial altruism) goes further and besides altruism
toward in-group members claims the existence of hostility toward members of the rival
group. However, such hostility toward out-group subjects is not very common (Halevy
et al., 2008; Yamagishi and Mifune, 2016; Abbink et al., 2012).
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important to understand the effort level that players choose in group contest.
Our contribution to this issue is to see if over-expenditure holds with the
inverse proportional sharing rule.
1.1.3. Heterogeneity in behavior
While the theoretical predictions are based on symmetry, in real life in-
dividuals differ in a myriad of ways that may affect their behavior. In most
experimental studies on group contest some degree of heterogeneous behav-
ior can be observed. For instance in Abbink et al. (2010), on average, the
most contributing group member expends three times more effort than the
least contributing member.6 We do not only observe heterogeneity on the
individual level, but also on the group level. In Abbink et al. (2010), for in-
stance, the most competitive group made six times more effort than the least
competitive group. Note that this difference is substantially higher than the
individual difference, so individual heterogeneity is probably not enough to
explain these group-level differences. Parochial altruism and social identity
theory are natural candidates for explaining at least partially the differences.
Besides the principal aim to see if behavior is different under the egali-
tarian and the inverse proportional rule, another objective of this study is
to investigate which individual characteristics and to which extent associate
with differences in individual behavior. Sheremeta (2018a) pursues the same
goal studying individual contests. He elicits loss and risk aversion, cognitive
abilities and impulsiveness. He shows that cognitive abilities affect overbid-
ding, but impulsiveness has an even larger predictive power.
2. Model
We present briefly the structure of group contest, relying heavily on the
survey by Sheremeta (2018b).7 There are two groups that compete to win
a contest and receive a prize υ. There are NA / NB players in group A /
B. Players in both groups choose simultaneously and independently a level
of effort xiA and xjB that is irreversible and the effort entails heterogeneous
6Theoretically, the existence of asymmetric equilibria may explain why we observe
different levels of effort, (see, for instance Baik, 1993, 1994).
7Konrad et al. (2009); Flamand et al. (2015); Gavrilets (2015) also provide a nice
introduction to the theory of group contest.
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costs ciA(xiA) and cjB(xjB), for all i = 1, ..., NA and j = 1, ..., NB. In our
experiment groups are composed by four individuals (NA = NB = 4).
The performance of group A / B, denoted as XA / XB is a function of
all individual efforts within the given group. For instance, for group A
XA = fA(x1A, ...x1NA) (1)
The most widely used function in the literature assumes perfect substitution
fA(x1A, ...x1NA) =
NA∑
i=1
xiA. (2)
This function describes nicely real-life situations in which the performance
of the group hinges on the joint effort of all individuals of the group.8 We
also use this perfect-substitute function in both treatments. As of costs of
effort, for simplicity we assume homogeneous linear costs, that is ciA(x) =
cjB(x) = x for all i = 1, ..., NA and j = 1, ..., NB.
The probability of winning the contest depends on the relative perfor-
mance of the groups. A contest success function (CSF) determines the prob-
ability that group A wins the prize:
pA(XA, XB) =
(XA)
r
(XA)r + (XB)r
(3)
The parameter r ≥ 0 represents the sensitivity of the probability of winning
to the ratio of group performances. One of the most used CSF is when
r = 1. In this case (often called the lottery case) higher performance implies
linearly higher winning probabilities. We use also the lottery CSF in both of
our treatments.9
Up to this point we follow the literature and use a known performance
functions and CSF parameter. Our main modification is in the way the prize
is split. In the literature, a general way to capture the division of the prize
is the following. In the case group A wins the prize, player i receives a share
of the prize which is defined by the following sharing rule (e.g. Nitzan, 1991)
siA(x1A, ...xNAA) =
αA
NA
+ (1− αA) xiA∑NA
i=1 xiA
. (4)
8When group performance depends on the best / worst performer within the group,
then other functions are more suitable.
9An alternative and often used possibility is the auction case (r =∞), when the group
with the highest performance wins the contest with certainty.
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In words, share αA of the prize is split equally among all members of the
winning group, and the rest (1− αA) is divided according to relative effort.
Complete egalitarian division occurs if αA = 1, while if αA = 0, then the
prize is split completely in proportion to relative effort. In our egalitarian
treatment we use the complete egalitarian division, corresponding to αA = 1.
For the other treatment, we propose a new sharing rule that states that the
share of the prize that a member receives is inversely proportional to relative
effort. More concretely, the less effort a member makes, the more she receives
proportionally from the prize. We define the inverse proportional share in
the following way:
siA(x1A, ...xNAA) =
1
xiA∑
1
xiA
if xiA > 0,
siA(x1A, ...xNAA) =
1
card(xiA=0)
if xi = 0 and
∑
1
xiA
> 0,
(5)
where card(xiA = 0) denotes the cardinality of players in group A who
contributed zero. In words, when player i in group A contributes a positive
amount then she receives the inverse proportional share. However, for xiA = 0
the expression is not well-defined, but by the logic of the sharing rule, in
that case player i receives all the prize if the other members of the group
contributed a positive amount, and shares the prize equally with those who
also contributed zero. If nobody contributes (
∑
1
xiA
= 0) and the group wins
the contest (in the very unlikely case when nobody contributes in the rival
group either and the prize is allocated randomly to one of the groups), then
the prize is split equally.
To illustrate the effect of sharing rules consider the following example.
Suppose a group with subjects A,B,C and D who made the following efforts
1,2,4 and 4, respectively. In the egalitarian treatment, upon winning the
contest all of the members would receive 1
4
of the prize. However, the inverse
proportional rule gives four / two times as much share from the prize to
subject A / B, than to subjects C and D who receive the same share. The
formula above yields the following shares: 1
2
, 1
4
, 1
8
and 1
8
respectively to
subjects A, B, C and D.
Given perfect substitution in the performance function, homogeneous
linear costs, a lottery contest success function (r = 1), equal group sizes
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(NA = NB = N) and the egalitarian sharing rule, the expected payoff of a
risk-neutral player i in group A can be written as:
piiA(x1A, ...xNA, XB) =
∑N
i=1 xiA
(
∑N
i=1 xiA +
∑N
j=1 xjB)
1
N
υ − xiA (6)
The first term of the expected payoff represents the expected benefit of
contributing effort xiA. Higher effort of player i in group A increases the
probability of group A winning the contest, but yields the same share of the
prize ( 1
N
) for all members of group A (if this group wins the contest). Cost
is captured by the second term. Hence, there is an inherent tension, because
player i has an incentive to cooperate with other members of his group, but
given the cost of cooperation, there is also an incentive to free ride.
In the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium with the egalitarian sharing
rule,
x∗1A = .. = x
∗
iA = .. = x
∗
NA =
υ
4N2
. (7)
Appendix A.1 contains the details of the proof following the line of
reasoning by Katz et al. (1990).
If we use the inverse proportional sharing rule, then the expected payoff
of a risk-neutral player i in group A can be written as:
piiA(x1A, ...xNA, XB) =
∑N
i=1 xiA
(
∑N
i=1 xiA +
∑N
j=1 xjB)
1
x1A∑
1
x1A
υ − xiA (8)
On the other hand, the unique Nash equilibrium under the inverse pro-
portional sharing rule implies:
x∗1A = .. = x
∗
iA = .. = x
∗
NA = 0. (9)
In Appendix A.2 we show that given this rule, zero effort is the dominant
strategy for each individual, so in the unique Nash equilibrium members of
the group contribute zero. Note that under this rule, the Nash equilibrium
in dominant strategies coincides with the socially efficient outcome: since
there is a fixed prize in the contest, it is socially efficient not to contribute
anything. While this efficient outcome is common in group contests, inverse
proportional sharing rule is the only one in which individual and social optima
coincide.
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The previous predictions are based on the following assumptions: i) play-
ers have identical valuations about the payoffs and winning the contest; ii)
players maximize their individual utility without regard to the team’s inter-
est; and iii) players are risk-neutral. Hence, deviations from the predictions
may be due (at least partly) to the fact that these assumptions do not hold.
3. Hypotheses
Over-expenditure of effort and heterogeneity of behavior can be affected
by the structure of the game. Therefore, group size, the group performance
function or the contest success function can influence how subjects behave
in group contest. In this study we focus on the role of the sharing rule and
on individual heterogeneity.
Prior to running the experiment, we registered it at the Open Science
Foundation (https://osf.io/93aus/). Next, we state the hypotheses as we
registered them and provide support for formulating those hypotheses based
on the literature. Our hypotheses can be grouped in two sets. Hypothesis
1 refers to the treatment effect and conjectures lower contributions in the
inverse proportional treatment than in the egalitarian treatment. The second
set of hypotheses refer to how different individual characteristics (measured
in phases 2-5 of the experiment) may affect individual contribution in the
group contest.
Hypothesis 1 (egalitarian vs. inverse proportional prize shar-
ing): We expect that contributions will be significantly lower in the treat-
ment with the inverse proportional prize sharing than in the treatment with
the egalitarian rule.
Most experiments use the egalitarian rule (for instance Nalbantian and
Schotter, 1997; Abbink et al., 2010, 2012; Ahn et al., 2011; Sheremeta, 2011;
Cason et al., 2012, 2017). Note that even this rule provides incentives for
free-riding, because a participant would receive the same share of the prize
upon making zero contribution than other members of the group who exerts
a positive level of effort. An evidence of such possible free-riding is pro-
vided by the comparison of the egalitarian and the proportional sharing rule.
Amaldoss et al. (2000); Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006) and Kugler
et al. (2010) compare the effect of egalitarian and proportional sharing rule
on behavior in group contest. The general finding is that the proportional
sharing rule leads to higher individual efforts than the egalitarian rule. Since
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the inverse proportional sharing rule provides more incentives to free-ride
than the egalitarian rule, we expect that under the former rule individual
efforts will be significantly lower than under the latter one as stated in our
Hypothesis 1.
Note that hypothesis 1 is silent about over-expenditure because theory
does not inform on if participants will contribute more than predicted by
the theory. We had no strong conviction based on the literature if over-
expenditure would be found in case of the inverse proportional sharing rule,
so we did not formulate it as a hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 (level of contribution and social value orientation):
We expect to see correlation between the classification according to social
value orientation and contribution in the group contest.
Social value orientation classifies participants into one of the following
categories (e.g. Murphy et al., 2011): altruist, prosocial, individualistic or
competitive. The nomenclature already suggests that the classification is
based on how much a participant cares about others. Often the first two
categories are lumped into one called prosocial, while the others two are
called proself.
There are many studies showing that the classification correlates with
behavior in the expected manner. Balliet et al. (2009) and Bogaert et al.
(2008) are two meta-studies that show that social value orientation corre-
lates with cooperation in social dilemmas, altruist and prosocial individuals
behaving in a more cooperative manner than individuals classified as in-
dividualists or competitors. Importantly, there are several studies indicat-
ing that proself individuals are less cooperative in the public goods game
(e.g. Parks, 1994; Offerman et al., 1996; De Cremer and Van Vugt, 1999;
De Cremer and Van Lange, 2001; De Cremer and Van Dijk, 2002; Smeesters
et al., 2003). Field studies also reveal that proself individuals behave differ-
ently from prosocial individuals. For instance McClintock and Allison (1989)
show that prosocial individuals exhibit more helping behavior than proself
ones. The same is found in case of proenvironmental initiatives (Joireman
et al., 2001) or choice between public transportation vs. commuting by car
(Van Vugt et al., 1995, 1996). Therefore, based on the literature, it is natural
to think that altruist and prosocial participants tend to contribute more to
the performance of the group than individualistic or competitive subjects.
Hypothesis 3 (level of contribution and risk aversion): We expect
that the more risk averse an individual is, the less she contributes in the
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group contest, ceteris paribus.
There are studies showing that risk attitudes correlate with contribution
in public goods game (Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis, 2002; Lange et al.,
2007; Charness and Villeval, 2009; Gangadharan and Nemes, 2009), more risk
averse individuals contributing less. Several studies have shown that risk has
many facets and the different aspects affect in different ways contributions in
public goods experiments. A basic distinction is often made between strate-
gic uncertainty (sometimes also called social risk) and risk related to random
events that are independent of human decisions and is termed as natural
risk or environmental uncertainty.10 Interestingly, Kocher et al. (2015) show
that while beliefs about others’ cooperation (that is, strategic uncertainty)
affects contribution to the linear public good in the expected positive way,
risk aversion measured a´ la Holt and Laury (2002) that captures natural risk
does not explain cooperation. However, there are papers (Wit and Wilke,
1998; Au, 2004) studying mainly step-level public goods games that show
that both types of risk affect contribution levels. However, in these papers
the environment of the decision is varied and the average level of coopera-
tion is investigated. We consider the effect of the environment (notably, the
sharing rule), but we focus also on the association between individual-level
risk attitudes and contribution.11
Contribution to the group performance is risky because winning the prize
depends on how much the other members contribute and the total contribu-
tion of the other group. These are factors beyond the control of the subjects
and represent a source of uncertainty. Not contributing to the group perfor-
mance lowers the probability of winning the prize but increases the amount
of earnings because the money not contributed is a certain earning for the
participants. Since due to the contest nature contribution is even more risky
than in a simple public goods game, we hypothesize that anything else being
equal more risk aversion associates with less contribution.
10There is some evidence that individuals’ perception of these two types of risk is cor-
related (e.g. Bohnet et al., 2008).
11Wit and Wilke (1998) show that both type of risks and their interaction influence
contribution in the public goods game. Moreover, Au (2004) finds that environmental
uncertainty also affects contribution: in environments with less uncertainty, contributions
were higher. Suleiman et al. (2001) and McBride (2010) show that outcomes in step-level
public goods games are sensitive to the threshold and other parameters of the experiment.
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Hypothesis 4 (level of contribution and cooperativeness): Con-
tribution in the coopetition task and in the public goods game are expected
to correlate positively.
In the group contests that we study there is a tension between individual
and group interests. Contributing more to the group performance increases
the probability of winning, but lowers the individual earning, ceteris paribus.
This conflict is more pronounced in the case of the inverse proportional treat-
ment than in the egalitarian case. Contribution to the public account in the
public goods game is regarded as a proxy for cooperativeness (e.g. Chaud-
huri, 2011). Peysakhovich et al. (2014) show convincingly that on the indi-
vidual level decisions in different cooperation games are strongly correlated,
moreover they find evidence for temporal stability, suggesting that there is
a domain-general inclination towards cooperation. Hence, it is natural to
think that those participants who are more cooperative in the public goods
game, will be more cooperative in the group contests as well, independently
of the sharing rule.
Hypothesis 5 (level of contribution and competitiveness): There
is competition on two levels. Groups compete against each other, but on
the individual level there is a competition between the members of the same
group. If the group competition motive dominates, then the individuals who
are more competitive are expected to contribute more. If the competition on
the individual level is stronger than the group competition, then we expect
the opposite to happen. Hence, we expect to see an effect of competitiveness,
but we do not have strong expectations on the direction.
The formulation of hypothesis 5 suggests that in terms of competitiveness
we carry out a rather exploratory investigation.
4. Experiment
We had two treatments corresponding to the different sharing rules. We
ran a session per treatment. In each session, the experiment consisted of
five phases plus the questionnaire. In both treatments, phase 1 corresponded
to the group contest, while later phases represented experimental games to
gather information about the participants’ characteristics. More concretely,
in phase 2 we measured social attitudes using the social value orientation, in
phase 3 we used the public goods game to measure cooperativeness. Phase 4
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served to elicit risk preferences and in phase 5 we measured competitiveness
a´ la Niederle and Vesterlund (2007).
We made clear to participants that their final payoff will be the sum of
two payoffs plus the show-up fee. We explained that they will be paid for
their performance in phase 1 (the group contest) and from the other 4 phases
the computer would pick randomly one and that phase will be paid. We also
informed the participants that during the phases they will earn tokens that
at the end will be converted into Euros and we stated that the exchange
rate may change between phases, but in any case more tokens imply more
Euros.12
We also let subjects know that after the 5 phases there will be a ques-
tionnaire and after finishing the questionnaire they would be paid in private.
4.1. Group contest
In this phase, first groups of four subjects were formed randomly and
anonymously. There were 14 groups of 4 individuals in each session. This
phase consisted of 20 rounds. Groups were fixed for the 20 rounds and each
group played against another group, called rival group, such that the pair of
rival groups was also fixed across all experimental rounds (as, for instance in
(Abbink et al., 2010)).
At the beginning of each round, each subject received 1000 tokens that
she could use to buy competition tokens for her group, one competition token
costing one token. The tokens not used for buying competition tokens re-
mained on the account of the subject. Subjects knew that the other members
of the group started also with the same endowment and could buy competi-
tion tokens as well.
After each round, the amount of the competition tokens a group had ac-
cumulated determined the chance of winning the contest. More concretely,
imagine groups A and B. Suppose that members of group A / B have bought
1000 / 2000 competition tokens. Then, group B had twice as high proba-
bility of winning the contest (2/3) than group A (1/3). In other words, the
probability of winning the contest was proportional to the total competition
tokens of a given group divided by the competition tokens of both groups.
A wheel of fortune determined which group won the contest in the following
12We changed the exchange rates between tasks in a way that in expected terms the
payoffs in the different phases be equal.
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way. Following the previous example, two thirds of the wheel would belong
to group B and the rest to group A, and after spinning the wheel the winner
is the group over whose territory the pointer of the wheel stopped. We made
clear that the probability of winning increased in the number of competition
tokens.
The group that won the contest received a prize of 4000 tokens. We
had two treatments that differed in the way the prize was split within the
winning group. In the egalitarian treatment, each member of the winning
group received the same amount of the prize, that is 1000 tokens. In this
treatment the payoff of any member of the winning group is the sum of the
tokens that the participant did not use to buy competition tokens and the
1000 tokens won as a prize. The payoff of a subject in the loser group is
just the amount of tokens not used to buy competition tokens. For instance,
if a participant uses 350 tokens from her initial endowment of 1000 tokens
to buy competition tokens and her group wins the contest, then her final
payoff is (1000-350)+1000=1650 tokens. If the other group wins, then her
payoff is just 1000-350=650. In the inverse proportional treatment, the less
competition tokens a member of the winning group bought, the higher is her
share from the prize. In the instructions we explained the division of the
prize in this treatment using the following example. Assume a group that
consists of subjects A,B,C and D who have bought 100, 200, 400 and 400
competition tokens, respectively. Suppose that this group wins the contest.
Subjects C and D bought the same amount of competition tokens, so their
payoff from the prize will be the same. Subject A and B bought just 1
4
and
1
2
of the amount bought by subjects C and D, hence their payoff from the
prize will be four times and twice as much as the payoff of subjects C and
D. That is, A / B / C / D would receive 2000 / 1000 / 500 / 500 tokens
from the prize. In turn, it implies that in this round the payoff of A is
(1000-100)+2000=2900, the payoff of B is (1000-200)+1000=1800, while C
and D would receive (1000-400)+500=1100 tokens, both. As in the other
treatment, if the other group wins, then the group receives no prize and
the final payoff equals the initial endowment minus the tokens used to buy
competition tokens, that is A / B / C / D receives 900 / 800 / 600 / 600
tokens.
In both treatments at the end of each round, each participant obtained
the following information
• the number of competition tokens that she bought;
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• the total number of competition tokens that the group accumulated;
• the total number of competition tokens that the rival group accumu-
lated;
• whether the group the participant belongs to is the winner group;
• individual’s payoff in the round, expressed in tokens.
In both treatments, earnings in this phase consisted of the sum of the
payoffs of 5 randomly chosen rounds as, for instance, in Chowdhury et al.
(2014, 2016). Subjects knew that their earnings would be converted into
euros at the end of the experiment at the following exchange rate: 1000
tokens = 1.2 euros.
At the end of the phase, each participant was provided the information
on the five rounds randomly chosen to be paid to the participant and on
individual’s payoff per phase in tokens and in euros.
4.2. Other phases
The rest of the phases was the same in both treatments. In phase 2 we
measured social preferences using the social value orientation. There are
various ways to measure social value orientation, we followed Murphy et al.
(2011). Participants were randomly paired and each of them had to make 6
decisions. In each decision, subjects saw 9 payoff allocations, each allocation
containing a payoff for the decision-maker and a payoff for her co-player.
The decision-maker had to choose in all 6 decisions her preferred joint payoff
distribution. Choices can be scored to come up with a single score. Social
value orientation conceptualizes four idealized orientations:
• altruists maximize the allocation for the other party;
• prosocial individuals tend to maximize their own payoffs, but care also
about the other player’s payoff;
• subjects with individualistic tendencies are not concerned about the
other player, they just maximize their own payoffs;
• competitive individuals attempt to maximize their own payoffs, but at
the same time also minimize the other player’s payoff.
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The score achieved after choosing the 6 allocation allows to classify partici-
pants in one of the above categories. Participants knew that if at the end of
the experiment this phase would be chosen for payment, then the computer
would pick one of the six decisions and would randomly choose one of the
participants in each pair (called the elector) and the allocation chosen by
the elector in the given decision would be paid. The exchange rate used for
payment was 1 token = 0.02 Euros.
Phase 3 consisted of a one-shot play of the public goods game. We aimed
to measure cooperativeness with this game. We presented the most widely
used format of the public goods game, with four players, each of them en-
dowed with 1000 tokens. Participants had to decide how much of the en-
dowment to assign to a public account, knowing that everybody in the group
would receive 40% of the total amount assigned to the public account (that is,
marginal per capita return = 40%). The final earning of a subject consisted
of the amount not assigned to the public account and the amount received
from the public account. The exchange rate used for payment was 1 token
= 0.02 Euros.
Phase 4 served to elicit risk attitudes using the bomb risk elicitation task
(Crosetto and Filippin, 2013).13 Participants are presented the following
situation. There is a store with 100 boxes, one of them containing a bomb.
The bomb can be in any of the boxes with the same probability. Subjects
have to decide how many boxes they want to take out of the store. For each
box taken out that does not contain the bomb, they receive money (1 token),
but if the bomb happens to be in one of the boxes that have been taken out,
then their payoff in this task is zero. We explained that if for example they
decide to take out 7 boxes and the bomb is in box 42, then they would earn
7 tokens. However, if the decide to remove 56 boxes from the store and the
bomb is in box 51, then their earnings is zero. We informed participants that
if at the end of the experiment this task is the payoff-relevant task, the the
exchange rate would be 1 token = 0.1 Euros.
In phase 5, we measured participants’ competitiveness using the Niederle-
Vesterlund experimental procedure (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). The
only modification compared to the original study is that we used the slider
13Crosetto and Filippin (2016) compare four risk elicitation methods, among them the
bomb risk elicitation task. They show the pros and cons of each method and argue
convincingly that the bomb risk elicitation task is appropriate to distinguish between
subjects based on their risk attitudes.
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task (Gill et al., 2011; Gill and Prowse, 2018) instead of adding up numbers
as experimental task. Following Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), this phase
consisted of 4 subphases. In subphase 1, subjects performed the slider task
(positioning as many sliders on the number 50 as they could in a minute)
knowing that they would be paid on a piece-rate basis, earning 1 token for
each correctly positioned slider. We also explained that if at the end of the
experiment this task would be chosen for payment, then the exchange rate
would be 1 token = 0.15 Euros. In subphase 2, before playing again the
slider task, groups of 4 members were formed randomly and we informed
participants that they would be paid as in a tournament. More concretely,
we told them that only the member of the group with the highest number of
correctly placed sliders receives a payoff, but she receives 4 tokens for each
correctly positioned slider.14 We used the same exchange rate as before. We
also informed subjects that they would not know the result of the tournament
until the end of the phase. In subphase 3, we explained that they would
perform again the slider task and that they could choose the way to be
compensated: piece-rate payment as in subphase 1 or tournament payment
as in subphase 2. Hence, we have a binary classification: participants are
either competitive (if they choose the tournament) or not competitive (if they
choose the piece-rate scheme). As before, we explained that we would not
tell them the result of the tournament until the end of the phase. We applied
the same exchange rate here as in the previous subphases. In subphase 4,
participants were not required to perform the task again, but could earn
money by choosing an incentive scheme (piece rate vs. tournament) to be
applied to their performance in subphase 1. We reminded participants about
the number of correctly positioned sliders in subphase 1. We used the same
exchange rate as in the previous subphases. This subphase allows us to see
what participants believed about their relative performance. Participants
knew that if phase 5 would be paid at the end of the experiment, then one
of the subphases would be chosen randomly and earnings in that subphase
would be paid.
At the end of the experiment, subjects had to fill in a questionnaire.
We elicited socio-demographic information (age, gender, educational attain-
ment, field of study, knowledge of languages, number of siblings, education
14We also explained that in case of a tie, the computer randomly would select one of
the members with the highest number of sliders correctly positioned.
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and employment of the breadwinner in the family, number of persons in
the household, factors related to family income), biological features (height,
weight, dexterity: left- vs right-handed, and the digit ratio).15 We also mea-
sured cognitive abilities with a 5-item version of the Cognitive Reflection
Test (Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2014). We used a 10-item version of the
Big Five test (Rammstedt and John, 2007) to elicit personality traits and
the Rosenberg test (Rosenberg, 1965) to measure self-esteem . We also asked
participants if they were happy in general.
4.3. Procedures
There were two sessions corresponding to the two treatments in July, 2018
in the laboratory of LINEEX (Valencia, Spain). In both sessions, there were
56 individuals. In the egalitarian / inversely proportional treatment 39.3%
and 66.1% of the subjects were females.
Sessions lasted about two hours and participants earned on average 18
Euros. There were subjects studying Economics or Business, but 36% studied
social sciences, 22% engineering and architecture, 16% health sciences, and
5% arts and humanities.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 shows the average effort per period in the two treatments. Visual
inspection strongly suggests that there is a treatment effect because in the
egalitarian treatment average effort is considerably higher in each period
(except period 1) than in the inverse proportional treatment.
The average effort in the egalitarian / inverse proportional treatment is
332.3 / 124.8, efforts being more than 2.5 times larger in the egalitarian
treatment than in the inverse proportional one, on average. The same aver-
ages over the first / second / third and last 5 rounds are 353.3 / 183.8 (92%
more effort in the egalitarian treatment) for the first, 371 / 129.5 (186% more
15We gathered information on participants’ digit ratio since we believed that there might
be some relationship between digit ratio and decisions in the group contest. There is a
growing literature indicating that digit ratio associates with several individual character-
istics, such as competitiveness, social preferences, and risk aversion among other domains
of economic interest (Bran˜as-Garza et al., 2013, 2018; Garbarino et al., 2011; Millet and
Dewitte, 2006; Pearson and Schipper, 2012)
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Figure 1: Average effort per period
effort in the egalitarian treatment) for the second, 319.1 / 100.2 (218% more
effort in the egalitarian treatment) for the third and 303.8 / 92.3 (229% more
effort in the egalitarian treatment) for the last 5 rounds.
The two-sample Wilcoxon ranksum test confirms what we see, as for all
periods except period 1 there is a significant difference in the effort made
between the two treatments (p<0.001 in all cases). If we do not distinguish
between periods and pool all the efforts together, we observe a significant
difference using the same test (p<0.001). In both treatments we observe a
marked downward trend. However, even in the last 5 periods in the egalitar-
ian treatment efforts are higher than in the first 5 periods in the inverse pro-
portional treatment, the difference being significant (two-sample Wilcoxon
ranksum test, p<0.001).
We also carry out within-subject tests to compare decisions in the first
and last five rounds to see if there is indeed a downward trend. In fact, there
is statistically significantly lower effort in the last 5 rounds relative to the
first 5 rounds in both treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value= 0.085
in the egalitarian treatment and p-value<0.001 in the inverse proportional
treatment).
Remember that the theoretical symmetric prediction for the egalitarian
treatment is υ
4N2
, that for υ = 4000 and N = 4 implies a predicted individ-
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ual effort of 62.5. Given average efforts of 332.2, we have an 431.5% over-
expenditure in the egalitarian treatment, on average. Similarly, the average
effort of 124.8 tokens in the inverse proportional treatment is much higher
than the predicted zero contribution. Hence, although contributions in the
inverse proportional treatment are significantly lower, than in the egalitar-
ian treatment, we observe over-expenditure even in the inverse proportional
treatment. Moreover, observing a decrease in the effort across rounds in each
experimental treatment, we look for differences between predicted and actual
effort exerted by participants in the last 5 rounds, which is 303.9 and 94.9
in egalitarian and inverse proportional treatment respectively. t-test shows
statistically significant differences in average effort with respect to predicted
effort of 62.5 in egalitarian and 0 in inverse proportional treatment (p<0.001
in both treatments), suggesting the presence of the over-expenditure in both
treatments even at the end of the group contest phase. Figure 2 provides
further support to the treatment effect, indicating the histograms of efforts in
the two treatments. Efforts in the inverse proportional treatment are clearly
more skewed to the left than in the egalitarian treatment, resulting in over-
all less effort. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects clearly (p<0.001) the
equality of the effort distributions in the two treatments.
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Figure 2: Histogram of efforts in the treatments
The above descriptive statistics and tests strongly suggest that there is
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a difference in the behavior of participants between treatments. Subjects
in the egalitarian treatment on average made considerably more effort than
participants in the inverse proportional treatment.16
In Table 1 we represent the choices of the subject in the other tasks. In
the social value orientation, 59% of the participants were classified as proso-
cial, that is very similar to other studies (e.g. Murphy et al., 2011).17 In
the bomb risk elicitation task the mean / median / standard deviation of
the boxes is 45.9 / 47 / 15.2 which is in line with results found in other
experiments (e.g. Crosetto and Filippin, 2013, 2016). Moreover, we do not
see any gender differences when we consider treatments together or sepa-
rately (Wilcoxon ranksum test, p>0.17 always), similarly to other studies
that use this risk elicitation method, (see Crosetto and Filippin, 2013, 2016).
Contribution in the public goods game is generally in the range of 40-60%
in the literature, (see, for instance Chaudhuri, 2011). In our experiment,
contribution levels are considerably lower. However, note that in our case
participants played the public goods game after the 20-period group contest
game in which they experienced a declining pattern of effort that might have
affected their contribution in the public goods game. A main finding of the
competition experiment by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) is that men are
more likely to enter tournaments than women, a pattern that we observe in
our data as well.18 Overall, we believe that the behavior that we observe in
these games and tasks is in line with what has been found in the literature.
Table 1 also reveals that while in the case of social value orientation and
risk tolerance we do not observe a marked difference between treatments,
cooperativeness (captured by contribution in the public goods game) and
competitiveness vary considerably between treatments.
In Table 2 we depict the pairwise correlations between the individual
16As a further evidence, consider the share of zero contributions in the different treat-
ments. This share is 5.18% in the egalitarian and 5.27% in the inverse proportional treat-
ment, the difference is not significant (according to the two-sample Wilcoxon ranksum test
and the test of proportions). However, the share of zeros increases more quickly over time
in the inverse proportional treatment (see Appendix C.1).
17Anderl et al. (2015) show that social value orientation fluctuates with the menstrual
cycle, so the gender breakdown may be not very informative since we do not know anything
about the participants’ menstrual cycle.
18Despite the considerable difference in competitiveness between males and females,
neither the Wilcoxon ranksum test, nor the test of proportions do reveal a significant
difference.
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Social Value Orientation
(% of prosocial)
Risk tolerance
(# of boxes)
Contribution in PGG
(% of endowment)
Competitiveness
(% of competitive)
Overall 58.9 (52.5 / 66) 45.9 (46.7 / 45) 27.6 (20.9 / 35) 48.2 (54.2 / 41.5)
Egalitarian 58.9 (45.5 / 67.6) 46.9 (45.9 / 47.5) 35.2 (24.6 / 42) 44.6 (50 / 41.2)
Inverse proportional 58.9 (56.8 / 63.2) 44.9 (47.2 / 40.5) 20 (18.7 / 22.4) 51.8 (56.8 / 42.1)
Table 1: Performance in the other tasks. In brackets the first number corresponds to males
and the second to females.
choices in the group contest, treatment and choices in the social value orien-
tation (SVO), bomb risk elicitation task (BRET), public goods game (PGG)
and the competitiveness task. For social value orientation we classify partici-
pants either as prosocial or as individualistic, by employing a dummy that is
1 if the participant is prosocial. In the bomb risk elicitation task we measure
risk tolerance, so larger values here denote less risk aversion. In the public
goods game the contribution to the common project is our measure of co-
operativeness, higher values representing more cooperative individuals. To
measure competitive behavior, we have a dummy that takes on the value of 1
if the subjects chooses to compete in subphase 3 of the competition task. In
order not to inflate the number of observations, we only consider the average
effort over the 20 rounds.19
Variables Average Effort Treatment Prosocial Risk attitudes Contribution Competitiveness
(=1 if inverse prop.) (SVO) (BRET) (PGG) (=1 if competitive)
Average Effort 1.000
Treatment -0.562*** 1.000
(=1 if inverse prop.) (0.000)
Prosocial (SVO) -0.065 0.018 1.000
(0.493) (0.852)
Risk attitudes (BRET) 0.096* -0.065 0.016 1.000
(0.315) (0.497) (0.864)
Contribution (PGG) 0.404*** -0.318*** -0.149 0.169* 1.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.117) (0.074)
Competitiveness -0.077 0.071 -0.019 0.271** 0.112 1.000
(=1 if competitive) (0.418) (0.454) (0.846) (0.004) (0.240)
Observations 112 112 112 112 112
P-values in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 2: Pairwise correlations between behavior in the group contest, treatment and the
subsequent games and tasks.
Table 2 also indicates that there is a treatment effect as being in the
19If we carry out the same exercise over the first / last five periods in the group contest,
we obtain qualitatively the same pattern, see section Appendix C.2.
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inverse proportional treatment is associated with significantly lower efforts.
Prosociality as measured by the Social Value Orientation does not seem to
be correlated with effort. More risk-tolerant participants tend to make more
effort in the experiment, though the effect is only marginally significant. Co-
operativeness measured as contribution in the public goods game is highly
correlated with the average effort made by the subjects. Those who con-
tributed more in the public goods game, made also more effort in the group
contest. Treatment is also correlated with contribution in the public goods
game, the contributions being lower in the inversely proportional case. At
first sight, competitive behavior as measured by the Niederle-Vesterlund task
is not associated with effort made in the group contest. Note also that there is
some significant positive correlation between risk tolerance and contribution
in the public goods game and risk tolerance and competitive behavior.
This correlation analysis gives some support to Hypothesis 1, 3 and 4.
Hence, there seems to be a treatment effect; more risk averse subjects con-
tribute less and contribution in the public goods game is positively correlated
with contribution in the group contest. However, behavior in the Social Value
Orientation and competitiveness measured a´ la Niederle-Vesterlund do not
seem to be associated with behavior in the group contest.
5.2. Regression analysis
Correlations are informative, but not enough to disentangle the effects,
so we proceed with a regression analysis.
The variable Treatment is a dummy with value equal to 1 if the observa-
tion comes from the inverse proportional treatment. Prosocial (SVO) is also
a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is classified prosocial.20 Risk at-
titude is represented by the variable Risk preferences (Bomb task) that mea-
sures the number of boxes the participant decided to take out of the store.
The higher this number, the more risk-tolerant a subject is. Contribution
(PGG) indicates the amount of tokens contributed to the common project
and is a natural measure of cooperativeness: the higher is the amount, the
more cooperative is the participant. Competitiveness (Niederle et. al. 2007)
is a dummy variable with value 1 if the subject chose the tournament pay-
ment instead of the piece-rate payment in phase 3 of the competition task.
20We note that no individual in our experiments was classified either as altruistic or
competitive.
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In Figure 1 we see a clear declining pattern of effort, so we control for that
by introducing the variable Period indicating the period that the decision was
made in. To account for past experience we include the variables Group’s
total effort (t-1) and Rival group’s total effort (t-1) that indicate the total
effort of the participant’s group and the total effort of the rival group in
the previous period. These variables also control then for the probability of
having won the contest in the last period. To reveal potential interactions
between treatment and the previous variables, we created a set of interaction
terms.
We also consider a wide range of controls related to socio-demographic
variables as female, age, body mass index, digit ratio (see footnote 12), and
academic degree that measures participant’s education level corresponding
to the following categories: no formal education, secondary school, bachelor,
master, and doctorate degree. We also gathered information regarding the
participant’s household like number of siblings, breadwinner, breadwinner’s
education and employment.21 Breadwinner’s employment provides the infor-
mation on whether the breadwinner is a student, without employment, but
currently searching for it, employed, self-employed, or others. Work measures
the hours worked by participant per week: zero hour, less than 5 hours, from
5 to 10 hours, from 10 to 15 hours, from 15 to 30 hours, and more than 30
hours.
We also include in some specifications variables related to linguistic and
cognitive abilities. More concretely, we take into account the number of
languages that indicates the number of languages spoken by the participant.22
To measure participants’ cognitive ability we use the Cognitive Reflection
Test (Frederick, 2005) and borrow the definition of the variables reflective
and irreflective from Cueva et al. (2016). Reflective measures the number of
correct answers, while irreflective measures the number of answers provided
by the participant impulsively, which are wrong, in the test.
With a final set of variables, we also control for the personality of the
participants. The short BIG Five test allows us to assess the agreeable-
ness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, openness of the subjects.
21Breadwinner indicates the person who is in charge of the main financial responsibilities
in the household: the participant, her father/mother, her spouse, absence of breadwinner.
22Since the participants of our study come from a bilingual region of Spain, we wanted
to investigate to what extent being fluent in Catalan and other languages (in addition to
Spanish) explains their decisions.
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Moreover, using the Rosenberg-test we have a measure of their self-esteem as
well. We include also their self-reported happiness in this set of personality
variables.
In all specifications except 4 and 8, we see a clear treatment effect (signif-
icant at 1 %), indicating that in the inverse proportional treatment partici-
pants contribute less. Prosociality as captured by the social value orientation
is not associated with the efforts of the individuals, even the sign of the coef-
ficient is changing. If we interact this variable with treatment, we do not see
any significant effect either. Risk tolerance exhibits a consistent positive as-
sociation with effort, more risk-tolerant subjects contributing more, but the
effect is only marginally significant in only one specification. The interaction
between risk attitudes and treatment does not reveal any significant asso-
ciation. Cooperativeness proxied by contribution in the public goods game
has a consistent and significant positive effect in all specifications, indicating
that more cooperative individuals tend to make more effort in group contest,
ceteris paribus. The effect of cooperativeness is not contingent on treatment,
as indicated by the interaction term. The effect of competitiveness is less
clear. Even though it associates negatively with effort in a consistent man-
ner, it is significant only in one specification. However, in specification 4
we see a weak interaction effect, indicating that in the inverse proportional
treatment competitive participants tended to make more effort. The negative
and always significant effect of period reflects just the declining pattern that
we observed in Figure 1 and the lack of significance in the interaction term
reveals that this effect is not substantially different between treatments. The
group’s total effort and the rival group’ total effort have very similar effects
that are consistently and significantly positive throughout the specifications:
the higher is (own or rival group’s) total effort in the last period, the higher
is the effort made by the individual. The interaction terms show that these
effects do not differ between treatments.23 In specifications 4 and 8, the
variable Treatment is not significant, suggesting the lack of treatment ef-
fect. However, note that through the interaction terms involving treatment
we control for the treatment effect and those interaction terms capture the
effect of the treatment.24
23We re-run the regressions including the variable on whether the group won the contest
in the previous period. It does not affect decision in the current period.
24From the rest of the variables that we used as controls none shows a consistently
significant pattern. For details, see Appendix E.
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Table 3: Effort (Linear model)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 est7 est8
Treatment (=1 if inverse) -207.470∗∗∗ -174.360∗∗∗ -115.141∗∗∗ -45.286 -113.833∗∗∗ -109.147∗∗∗ -103.638∗∗∗ -51.748
(29.096) (29.998) (30.357) (101.882) (31.686) (30.995) (30.481) (109.019)
Prosocial(SVO) -7.978 -3.751 19.190 0.348 -5.331 -12.736 15.118
(28.583) (27.089) (39.255) (29.467) (27.502) (28.328) (47.553)
Risk preferences (Bomb task) 0.556 0.805 2.508∗ 1.061 0.754 0.505 1.904
(0.979) (0.927) (1.407) (0.954) (0.937) (0.947) (1.582)
Contribution (PGG) 0.195∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗
(0.064) (0.061) (0.072) (0.064) (0.062) (0.064) (0.083)
Competitiveness (Niederle et. al. 2007) -31.252 -30.550 -92.325∗∗ -8.735 -26.776 -34.127 -56.054
(29.623) (28.020) (41.599) (30.328) (28.516) (28.798) (46.615)
Period -4.005∗∗∗ -4.736∗∗∗ -3.990∗∗∗ -4.009∗∗∗ -3.991∗∗∗ -4.725∗∗∗
(0.729) (0.985) (0.729) (0.729) (0.728) (0.984)
Group’s total effort (t-1) 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Rival group’s total effort (t-1) 0.038∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Tr.*Prosocial -19.905 -26.863
(56.213) (64.850)
Tr.*Risk preferences -2.842 -1.992
(1.919) (2.120)
Tr.*Contribution -0.052 -0.075
(0.137) (0.150)
Tr.*Competitiveness 109.603∗ 83.816
(57.229) (62.676)
Tr.*Period 1.759 1.776
(1.526) (1.525)
Tr.*Group’s effort 0.001 0.003
(0.023) (0.023)
Tr.*Rival group’s effort 0.017 0.016
(0.023) (0.023)
Socio-demographics (9 variables) NO NO NO NO YES NO NO YES
Linguistic and cogn. ability (3 var.s) NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES
Personality charact.s (7 variables) NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
Constant 332.305∗∗∗ 255.457∗∗∗ 182.981∗∗∗ 125.841∗ -166.340 138.749∗ 522.524∗∗ 312.247
(20.574) (52.736) (54.789) (76.141) (436.257) (79.504) (214.301) (581.125)
Observations 2240 2240 2128 2128 2128 2128 2128 2128
Standard errors in parentheses.Rnd Eff. Panel Linear Model. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Socio-demographics: Female, Age, Body Mass Index, Academic degree, 2-4DR(left hand), Number of siblings, Breadwinner, Breadwin.’s employm., Work (hrs/week).
Cognitive ability: Reflective, (Ir)reflecitve, Number of languages
Personality characteristics:Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Neuroticism, Openness, Happiness (degree), Self-esteem
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In section Appendix D we carry out the same analysis, but separately for
each treatment. This analysis reveals that cooperativeness has a markedly
lower effect in the egalitarian treatment than in the inverse proportional
treatment. Prosociality, risk attitudes and competitiveness do not show a
significant association with effort in these regressions. The group’s and the
rival group’s total effort have the same effect as before.
6. Conclusion
In many instances, cooperation and competition is present at the same
time, a situation named coopetition. We study coopetition on the group
level. Groups compete for a prize and cooperation between the members of
the group increases the probability of winning the contest. More concretely,
the more overall effort a group makes in the form of contributions, the pro-
portionally higher is the chance of obtaining the prize. Within the group we
introduce a second layer of competition as the prize is split up as a func-
tion of individual contributions. In the egalitarian treatment, the prize is
divided equally among the members of the group, while in the inverse pro-
portional treatment those who contribute less, receive a proportionally larger
share. Such sharing rules represent incentives to make less contributions as
the earnings in case of winning are then higher. In the inverse proportional
treatment such incentives are arguably stronger as supported by our theo-
retical predictions.
In coopetitive situations, the tension between cooperation and competi-
tion is a central topic in the management literature. The inverse proportional
treatment clearly represents a case of more intense tension. Our paper is the
first attempt to see how increasing the tension this way affect the level of ef-
fort that members of a group make. We motivate this stark contrast between
cooperation and competition by a resource constraint argument: agents have
some level of resources that they can either dedicate to cooperation or com-
petition. The more they dedicate to cooperation, the less resource they will
have for competition.
We find that indeed the level of effort is significantly higher in the egal-
itarian treatment than in the inverse proportional treatment. In line with
the literature, we document overexpenditure in the egalitarian treatment,
and interestingly we observe overexpenditure also in the inverse proportional
treatment. In the experiment we measured economic preferences to see if they
affect the choice of contribution. We see that more cooperative participants
30
choose a higher level of effort in both treatments. Competitive preferences
have some effect in the inverse proportional treatment: more competitive
participants contributing larger amounts from their endowment. Social and
risk preferences do not seem to have any effect.
Our results are in line with findings in the management literature in the
sense that when forces conducive to competition dominate, then cooperation
is harmed. Future research will tell if this finding holds also for other group
contest setups where the performance of the group or the contest success
function are different from ours. Another interesting question is how our
findings change if the prize is a function of the effort made by the members
of the groups.
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Appendix A. Theoretical predictions
In this section we derive the theoretical predictions of the model.
Appendix A.1. Egalitarian case
Given perfect substitution in the performance function, homogeneous
linear costs, a lottery contest success function (r = 1), equal group sizes
(NA = NB = N) and the egalitarian sharing rule, the expected payoff of a
risk-neutral player i in group A can be written as:
piiA(x1A, ...xNA, XB) =
∑N
i=1 xiA
(
∑N
i=1 xiA +
∑N
j=1 xjB)
1
N
υ − xiA (A.1)
As in Katz et al. (1990), we use the Nash equilibrium to find the solution.
Assuming a regular interior solution, the first-order condition for members
of group A is
∂piiA
∂xiA
=
∑N
j=1 xjB
(
∑N
i=1 xiA +
∑N
j=1 xjB)
2
1
N
υ − 1 = 0 (A.2)
Similarly, for group B
∂pijB
∂xjB
=
∑N
j=1 xiA
(
∑N
i=1 xiA +
∑N
j=1 xjB)
2
1
N
υ − 1 = 0 (A.3)
In a symmetric equilibrium, x1A = x2A.. = xiA = .. = xNA and x1B =
x2B.. = xjB = .. = xNB, the previous conditions become
∂piiA
∂xiA
=
xjB
N2(x2iA + 2xiAxjB + x
2
jB)
υ − 1 = 0 (A.4)
and
∂pijB
∂xjB
=
xiA
N2(x2iA + 2xiAxjB + x
2
jB)
υ − 1 = 0 (A.5)
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These first-order conditions imply that in equilibrium x∗iA = x
∗
jB. As a
consequence, we obtain that
x∗1A = .. = x
∗
iA = .. = x
∗
NA =
υ
4N2
(A.6)
Appendix A.2. Inverse proportional case
In the proof, we will use the following additional notation:
XA−i =
∑
jA,j 6=i xj
By our defintion the inverse proportional rule implies the following ex-
pected payoffs:
pii (xi,A, XA−i, XB) =
XA
XA +XB
x−1i,A∑
jA x
−1
j
v − xi,A (A.7)
pii (0, XA−i, XB) =
XA−i
XA−i +XB
v for ∀xj 6=i,j∈A > 0 (A.8)
The second line specifies that if all other members of group A contribute
a positive amount while member i’s contribution is zero, then in case group
A wins the contest, member i will receive the whole prize.
Next, we prove that the individual payoff upon contributing a positive
amount is less than the payoff related to zero contribution, conditional on all
the other members of the group contributing a positive amount:
pii (xi,AXA−i, XB)−pii (0, XA−i, XB) = XA
XA +XB
x−1i,A∑
jA x
−1
j
v−xi,A− XA−i
XA−i +XB
v =
=
[
XA
(XA+XB)
x−1i,A
(
∑
jA x
−1
j )
− XA−i
(XA−i+XB)
]
v − xi,A =
=
[
XA·x−1i,A·(XA−i+XB)−XA−i·(XA+XB)(
∑
jA x
−1
j )
(XA+XB)(
∑
jA x
−1
j )(XA−i+XB)
]
v − xi,A =
=
[
XA·x−1i,A·XA−i+XA·x−1i,A·XB−XA−i·XA·(
∑
jA x
−1
j )−XA−i·XB ·(
∑
jA x
−1
j )
(XA+XB)(
∑
jA x
−1
j )(XA−i+XB)
]
v − xi,A =
=
[
XB−XA−i·XA·(
∑
jA,j 6=i x
−1
j )−XA−i·XB ·(
∑
jA,j 6=i x
−1
j )
(XA+XB)(
∑
jA x
−1
j )(XA−i+XB)
]
v − xi,A =
=
[
[1−XA−i·(
∑
jA,j 6=i x
−1
j )]XB−XA−i·XA·(
∑
jA,j 6=i x
−1
j )
(XA+XB)(
∑
jA x
−1
j )(XA−i+XB)
]
v − xi,A =
=
[
[1−(
∑
jA,j 6=i xj)·(
∑
jA,j 6=i x
−1
j )]XB−XA−i·XA·(
∑
jA,j 6=i x
−1
j )
(XA+XB)(
∑
jA x
−1
j )(XA−i+XB)
]
v − xi,A < 0
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(A.9)
since
(∑
jA,j 6=i xj
)
·
(∑
jA,j 6=i x
−1
j
)
> 1 always.
Hence, we proved that
pii (xi,AXA−i, XB)− pii (0, XA−i, XB) < 0,
so contributing zero yields always a higher payoff than contributing a
positive amount if the other members of the group contribute a positive
amount.
We turn now to the case when another member of the group contributes
zero. In this case, contributing a positive amount would yield the loss of the
contribution, because if the group wins the contest, then the member with
zero contribution obtains the whole prize, while in case of losing the contest
the contribution is lost anyway. Therefore, if another member of the group
contributes zero, then contributing zero yields a payoff that is higher than
the payoff related to a positive contribution.
Thus, we have shown that to contribute zero leads always to higher payoffs
than to contribute a positive amount in the case of the inverse proportional
sharing rule.
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Appendix B. Online Appendix - Instructions
The language of the instruction was Spanish as we ran the experiment in
Spain. Here we present the English version of the instructions.
Welcome to the experiment
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment! Please, read
carefully these instructions. The instructions are the same for all participants
with whom you are going to interact during the experiment.
This is an experiment to study how individuals make decisions. We are
interested in what individuals do on average.
Do not think that we expect any particular behavior from you. However,
keep in mind that your behavior affects the amount of money that you may
earn.
Next, you will see a series of instructions explaining how the experiment
works and how you can use the computer during the experiment.
Please, do not either speak to or disturb the other participants during
the experiment. If you need help, raise your hand and wait quietly. You will
be attended as soon as possible. From now on, no type of communication is
allowed with other participants. Please, switch off your mobile phone. If you
do not comply with the rules, you will be dismissed and you will not receive
any compensation for your participation.
The structure of the experiment is the following:
• PHASE 1
• PHASE 2
• PHASE 3
• PHASE 4
• PHASE 5
• QUESTIONNAIRE
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You will have to make decisions in all phases as we will explain during
the experiment. All your decisions will be treated confidentially.
The final payoffs will be the sum of two payoffs. The first payoff is the
one that you obtain in Phase 1 and the second payoff is the one that is picked
randomly from the payoffs related to the rest of the phases.
We record the earnings during the experiment as tokens that will be
converted into euros at an exchange rate that we specify in each phase. In
all cases, more tokens imply more euros.
After finishing the 5 phases, you will be asked to fill in a questionnaire
and then we will pay your earnings in euros in private.
(Treatments varied only in Phase 1. Next we report the instructions for
phase 1 for both treatments. First, we do it for the egalitarian treatment
and then for the inverse proportional treatment.)
Phase 1 - egalitarian treatment
Read carefully the following instructions in order to know what are the
decisions that you are going to make and how you can earn money.
In this phase of the experiment you will be a member of a group composed
of 4 persons in the room. These 4-person groups will be formed randomly
by the computer. You will not know the identities of the persons who are
in your group, neither will they know your identity. Hence, identity of all
members of the groups will remain anonymous. From the 56 individuals in
the room, 14 4-person groups will be formed.
This phase consists of 20 rounds.
Throughout this phase, your group will play against another group, so
your group and the other group will form a pair of rival groups. You will be
member of the same group during the 20 rounds and you will play against
the same rival group in each of the 20 rounds. The game consists in that the
rival groups compete for a prize, as we will explain it in detail now.
At the beginning of each round you will receive an individual endowment
of 1000 tokens. You can use this individual endowment of 1000 tokens to buy
’competition tokens’ for the public account of your 4-person group. Each
competition token costs 1 token of your individual endowment, hence you
may buy at most 1000 competition tokens. The tokens of your individual
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endowment that you do not spend on buying competition tokens for the
public account, will remain on your individual account. Similarly, the other
3 members of your group will have an endowment of 1000 tokens that they
can use to buy competition tokens for the public account of your 4-person
group.
At the end of each round, when each individual in the room has chosen
how many competition tokens to buy, a random process similar to a wheel
of fortune determines which group (the group that you belong to or the
rival group with whom your group competes) wins the prize. The prize is
4000 tokens. The probability of winning the prize depends on the amount of
competition tokens that your group has and on the amount of competition
tokens acquired by the rival group. More concretely, the following happens.
The ’wheel of fortune’ will be divided in two parts with different colors.
One part of the wheel belongs to your group and the other part to the rival
group. The size of the parts of the wheel represent exactly in a proportional
way the amount of competition tokens acquired by your group and the rival
group. For example, if your group and the rival group have acquired the
same amount of tokens, then each group has 50% of the ’wheel of fortune’.
If your group has acquired twice as many tokens as the rival group, then
your group has two thirds of the wheel and the rival group has the remaining
one third. Once the division of the wheel is determined by the competition
tokens of the groups, the wheel starts to spin and stops randomly after a
while. The wheel has an indicator in the position of 12 hours of a clock. The
prize will be won by the group above whose color the indicator of the wheel
is. Imagine that your group has acquired twice as many competition tokens
than the other group and the color of your group is red, while the color of the
rival group is blue. In this case, two thirds of the wheel will be red and one
third blue. If after stopping the wheel the indicator is above a part of the
wheel that is red, then your group wins the prize. However, if the indicator
is above the blue part, then the prize goes to the rival group.
Therefore, the probability that your group wins the prize increases in the
amount of competition tokens acquired by your group. In the same vein, the
more tokens the rival group acquires, the higher is the probability that the
rival group wins the prize. If one of the group does not acquire competition
tokens, while the other group acquires tokens, then the group with the tokens
wins with certainty. If none of the groups acquires tokens, the prize will be
assigned randomly to one of the groups.
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If your group wins the prize, then the 4000 tokens will be divided equally
among the members of the group, independently of how many competition
tokens each member of the group bought. That is, if a group wins the prize,
the members of the group will receive 1000 tokens. In this case, the total
amount of tokens obtained in the round would be the tokens of your initial
endowment not used to buy competition tokens and your share of the prize,
1000 tokens.
If your group does not win the contest, you will not receive anything
from the prize. In this case, your payoff in the round would be the initial
endowment minus the tokens used to buy competition tokens.
Imagine that you use 350 tokens from your initial endowment of 1000
tokens to buy competition tokens. Suppose that your group wins the contest
and obtains the prize. In this case, your payoff is (1000-350)+1000=1650
tokens in that round. Now assume that the other group wins the contest.
Then your payoff in that round would be 1000-350=650 tokens. The numbers
used in this example are fictitious.
The earnings will depend always on the amount of competition tokens
that the members of the groups buy and on the result of spinning the wheel
of fortune.
At the end of each round, after determing the winner of the contest, the
earnings of the round will be computed.
Moreover, at the end of each round you will receive the following infor-
mation:
• your contribution to the common cause (that is, how many competition
tokens you have bought);
• the total contribution of your group (that is, the total number of com-
petition tokens bought by the members of your group) ;
• the total contribution of the rival group (that is, the total number of
competition tokens bought by the members of the rival group);
• if your group has won the contest or not;
• your individual earning in the given round.
Your final earning in this phase of the experiment will be the sum of the
earnings obtained in 5 randomly chosen rounds from the 20 rounds that you
play in this phase.
The exchange rate in this phase of the experiment is the follow-
ing:
1000 tokens = 1.2 Euros (that is, 1 token = 0.12 Euro cents).
For example, if you earn 5000 tokens then you will receive 6 Euros.
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Phase 1 - inverse proportional treatment
Read carefully the following instructions in order to know what are the
decisions that you are going to make and how you can earn money.
In this phase of the experiment you will be a member of a group composed
of 4 persons in the room. These 4-person groups will be formed randomly
by the computer. You will not know the identities of the persons who are
in your group, neither will they know your identity. Hence, identity of all
members of the groups will remain anonymous. From the 56 individuals in
the room, 14 4-person groups will be formed.
This phase consists of 20 rounds.
Throughout this phase, your group will play against another group, so
your group and the other group will form a pair of rival groups. You will be
member of the same group during the 20 rounds and you will play against
the same rival group in each of the 20 rounds. The game consists in that the
rival groups compete for a prize, as we will explain it in detail now.
At the beginning of each round you will receive an individual endowment
of 1000 tokens. You can use this individual endowment of 1000 tokens to buy
’competition tokens’ for the public account of your 4-person group. Each
competition token costs 1 token of your individual endowment, hence you
may buy at most 1000 competition tokens. The tokens of your individual
endowment that you do not spend on buying competition tokens for the
public account, will remain on your individual account. Similarly, the other
3 members of your group will have an endowment of 1000 tokens that they
can use to buy competition tokens for the public account of your 4-person
group.
At the end of each round, when each individual in the room has chosen
how many competition tokens to buy, a random process similar to a wheel
of fortune determines which group (the group that you belong to or the
rival group with whom your group competes) wins the prize. The prize is
4000 tokens. The probability of winning the prize depends on the amount of
competition tokens that your group has and on the amount of competition
tokens acquired by the rival group. More concretely, the following happens.
The ’wheel of fortune’ will be divided in two parts with different colors.
One part of the wheel belongs to your group and the other part to the rival
group. The size of the parts of the wheel represent exactly in a proportional
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way the amount of competition tokens acquired by your group and the rival
group. For example, if your group and the rival group have acquired the
same amount of tokens, then each group has 50% of the ’wheel of fortune’.
If your group has acquired twice as many tokens as the rival group, then
your group has two thirds of the wheel and the rival group has the remaining
one third. Once the division of the wheel is determined by the competition
tokens of the groups, the wheel starts to spin and stops randomly after a
while. The wheel has an indicator in the position of 12 hours of a clock. The
prize will be won by the group above whose color the indicator of the wheel
is. Imagine that your group has acquired twice as many competition tokens
than the other group and the color of your group is red, while the color of the
rival group is blue. In this case, two thirds of the wheel will be red and one
third blue. If after stopping the wheel the indicator is above a part of the
wheel that is red, then your group wins the prize. However, if the indicator
is above the blue part, then the prize goes to the rival group.
Therefore, the probability that your group wins the prize increases in the
amount of competition tokens acquired by your group. In the same vein, the
more tokens the rival group acquires, the higher is the probability that the
rival group wins the prize. If one of the group does not acquire competition
tokens, while the other group acquires tokens, then the group with the tokens
wins with certainty. If none of the groups acquires tokens, the prize will be
assigned randomly to one of the groups.
If your group wins the prize, then the 4000 tokens will be divided among
the members of the group in the following way. In the winner group, the
member that has bought the least number of competition tokens obtains the
highest share of the prize, followed by the member who bought the second
lowest amount of competition tokens and so on. That is, the member that
bought the largest quantity of competition tokens, receives the lowest share
of the 4000-token prize. The difference in the quantities that the members
receive is inversely proportional to the competition tokens that the members
of the group acquired.
The next example will help you understand better how the prize is di-
vided. Assume that the members of a group, for instance A,B,C and D buy
100, 200, 400 and 400 competition tokens, respectively. In total, the group
has 1100 tokens. Suppose that the group wins the prize and obtains the 4000
tokens. As you see, members C and D bought the same amount of tokens,
while member A bought one quarter of the amount bought by members C
52
and D, and member B bought half of the quantity acquired by members C
and D.
Members C and D will receive the same amount from the prize since they
bought the same quantity of competition tokens. Member A will receive four
times as much as member C (and D), because she bought only one quarter
of what member C (and D) bought. Member B bought only half of what
member C (and D) bought, so she will receive the double of tokens from the
prize as members C (and D). For the same reason, since member A bought
only half the competition tokens that member B bought, she will obtain twice
as many tokens from the prize as member B. That is, from the 4000 tokens
of the prize, members A,B, C and D will receive 2000, 1000, 500 and 500
tokens, respectively.
Using the previous numbers and assuming that the group wins the prize,
the payoff of member A would be (1000-100)+2000=2900, the payoff of mem-
ber B would be (1000-200)+1000=1800, the payoff of member C would be
(1000-400)+500=1100 and the payoff of member D would be (1000-400)+500=1100.
If your group does not win the contest, you will not receive anything
from the prize. In this case, your payoff in the round would be the initial
endowment minus the tokens used to buy competition tokens. Using the
previous example and assuming that the rival group wins the prize the payoffs
of group members A,B,C and D would be 1000-100=900, 1000-200=800,
1000-400=600 and 1000-400=600 tokens, respectively.
The numbers used in this example are fictitious and the earnings will
depend always on the amount of competition tokens that the members of the
groups buy and on the result of spinning the wheel of fortune.
At the end of each round, after determining the winner of the contest,
the earnings of the round will be computed.
Moreover, at the end of each round you will receive the following infor-
mation:
• your contribution to the common cause (that is, how many competition
tokens you have bought);
• the total contribution of your group (that is, the total number of com-
petition tokens bought by the members of your group) ;
• the total contribution of the rival group (that is, the total number of
competition tokens bought by the members of the rival group);
• if your group has won the contest or not;
• your individual earning in the given round.
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Your final earning in this phase of the experiment will be the sum of the
earnings obtained in 5 randomly chosen rounds from the 20 rounds that you
play in this phase.
The exchange rate in this phase of the experiment is the follow-
ing:
1000 tokens = 1.2 Euros (that is, 1 token = 0.12 Euro cents).
For example, if you earn 5000 tokens, then you will receive 6 Euros.
(Phases 2-5 are the same in both treatments.)
Phase 2
Read carefully the following instructions in order to know what are the
decisions that you are going to make and how you can earn money.
In this phase of the experiment you will be paired with another person
in the room, that is, you will be part of a two-person group. The two-person
groups are formed randomly by the computer. You will not know the identity
of the other person who will be in your group, neither will she / he know that
you are the other member of the group. Hence, anonymity is maintained.
The decisions that any individual of this room makes are anonymous as well.
This phase consists of 6 experimental rounds.
In each round you will see on the screen a sequence of 9 pairs of numbers.
In each pair of numbers, one of the numbers is your payoff and the other
number is the payoff of the other person of your group. Your task in this
phase is to choose the pair of numbers that you prefer in each round.
Once everybody in the room has decided in each of the six rounds, we will
proceed with the calculation of the payoffs of this phase of the experiment.
First, the computer chooses randomly one of the 6 rounds that we will
use for the payoffs.
Once the payoff-relevant round is selected, the computer will pick ran-
domly one of the persons in each group who will be the Elector.
There is a 50% chance that you will be the Elector and and a 50% chance
that the other person in your group will be the Elector.
In this phase, the payoff of each person in the room will be the decision
made by the Elector in the group in the round that has been selected for
payoff.
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The exchange rate in this phase of the experiment is the follow-
ing:
1 token = 0.02 Euros (that is, 1 token = 2 Euro cents).
For example, if you earn 100 tokens, then you will receive 2 Euros.
Phase 3
Read carefully the following instructions in order to know what are the
decisions that you are going to make and how you can earn money.
In this phase of the experiment you will be part of a 4-person group. The
four-person groups are formed randomly by the computer. You will not know
the identity of the other persons who will be in your group, neither will they
know that you are a member of the group. Hence, anonymity is maintained.
The decisions that any individual of this room makes when interacting with
the other members of the her / his group are anonymous as well.
This phase consists of 1 experimental round.
At the beginning of the round everybody in the room will receive an en-
dowment of 1000 tokens. Your task is to decide how much of your endowment
to assign to the common account of the group. That is, you have to decide
how many tokens of the 1000 that you have you want to contribute to an
account that you share with the other members of your group. The other
members of your group will make the same decision, that is how many to-
kens from the initial endowment they assign to the common account of your
group.
Once everybody in the room has decided, we will proceed with the cal-
culation of the payoffs of this phase of the experiment.
In this phase, the individual payoff of each member of the group depends
on her / his decision, on the decisions of the other members of the group and
on a multiplier. We will explain the payoff in detail:
Your earning = initial endowment - contribution to the common account
+ 0.4* (common account of the group)
Pi = 1000− xi + 0.4(x1 + x2 + x3 + x4), where
• Pi is the individual earning
• 1000 is the initial endowment
• xi is your contribution to the common account
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• 0.4 is the multiplier
• x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 is the sum of the contributions of each member of
the group, that is the total of tokens accummulated in the common
account of your group
For example, if you contribute 250 tokens to the common account, while
the total contribution is 800, then you earn (1000-250)+0.4*800=1070 tokens.
The exchange rate in this phase of the experiment is the follow-
ing:
1 token = 0.002 Euros (that is, 1 token = 0.2 Euro cents).
For example, if you earn 500 tokens, then you will receive 1 Euro.
Phase 4
Read carefully the following instructions in order to know what are the
decisions that you are going to make and how you can earn money.
In a store there are 100 boxes, numbered from 1 to 100. In one of the
boxes there is a bomb. In the other 99 boxes there is money (each of them
contains money). You do not know which box contains the bomb, but you
know that it could be in any of the boxes with the same probability.
Your task in this phase is to choose how many boxes wou would take out
from the store. The boxes are numbered and will be taken out in numerical
order (starting with box 1). That is, if you want to take out 20 boxes, then
the boxes numbered from 1 to 20 will be collected. If you want to take out
57 boxes, then the boxes from 1 to 57 will be collected.
Once everybody in the room has decided, we will proceed with the cal-
culation of the payoffs of this phase of the experiment.
At the end of this phase, the computer will choose randomly a number
between 1 and 100 to determine in which box the bomb is. If the bomb is in
one of the boxes that you collected from the store, then you will earn nothing
in this phase of the experiment. However, if the bomb is not in the boxes
that you took out of the store, then you may open the boxes and you will
receive a token for each box.
Next, we will show some examples to illustrate how you can earn money
in this phase:
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Case A) Imagine that you decide to collect 7 boxes and the bomb is in
the box 42. Since you did not collect the box with the bomb, you earn a
token for each of the 7 boxes that you collected, that is your earnings will be
7 x 1 token = 7 tokens.
Case B) Imagine that you decide to collect 35 boxes and the bomb is in
the box 42. Since you did not collect the box with the bomb, you earn a
token for each of the 35 boxes that you collected, that is your earnings will
be 35 x 1 token = 35 tokens.
Case C) Imagine that you decide to collect 52 boxes and the bomb is in
the box 42. Since you did collect the box with the bomb, you earn zero token
in this phase.
Case D) Imagine that you decide to collect 68 boxes and the bomb is in
the box 73. Since you did not collect the box with the bomb, you earn a
token for each of the 68 boxes that you collected, that is your earnings will
be 68 x 1 token = 68 tokens.
Case E) Imagine that you decide to collect 10 boxes and the bomb is in
the box 7. Since you did collect the box with the bomb, you earn zero token
in this phase.
The exchange rate in this phase of the experiment is the follow-
ing:
1 token = 0.1 Euros (that is, 1 token = 10 Euro cents).
For example, if you earn 50 tokens, then you will receive 5 Euro.
Phase 5
Read carefully the following instructions in order to know what are the
decisions that you are going to make and how you can earn money.
In this phase you will have to complete 4 tasks. None of these tasks will
take more than 5 minutes. At the end of this phase, the computer will choose
randomly one of the 4 tasks and you will receive your earnings based on your
performance in that task. The computation of the earnings varies between
tasks as we will inform you before starting each of the tasks.
Task 1
In Task 1, you will see on the screen a series of sliders that you have
to work with during a minute. Each slider can be moved along the integer
numbers going from 0 to 100. At the beginning of the task each slider is
positioned at 0. Your task consists in moving as many sliders as you can in
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a minute to the number 50 with the help of the mouse. On the right hand
side of each slider you will see the number at which the slider is positioned.
You can use the mouse to readjust the position of the sliders as many times
as you need.
If Task 1 is chosen for payment in this phase of the experiment, then you
will receive 1 token for each slider positioned at the number 50. Your payoff
will not decrease in the number of sliders not positioned at the number 50.
That is, the payment depends on the number of sliders positioned at the
number 50.
The exchange rate in this phase of the experiment is the follow-
ing:
1 token = 0.15 Euros (that is, 1 token = 15 Euro cents).
For example, 20 tokens = 3 Euro.
Task 2
In this task you will have 1 minute to work with a set of sliders. This
task, as the previous one, consists in positioning sliders at the number 50.
However, in this task your earning depends on your performance in relation
to the performance of the members of the group that you belong to. That is,
your earning depends on the number of sliders positioned at the number 50
and the quantity of sliders that the other members of your group positioned
at the number 50. Each group in the room will be formed by 4 individuals,
so you will be in a group with 3 other persons in the room. The person of
the group that has the highest number of sliders positioned at the number
50 in a minute, will receive 4 tokens for each slider at the number 50, while
the other members of the group will receive 0 token.
You will not be informed about your performance in this tournament
until the end of this phase of the experiment. If there is a tie, the winner
will be chosen randomly by the computer.
Remember that in this task the only one to win tokens and hence money
is the one that positions the highest number of sliders correctly at the number
50.
The exchange rate in this phase of the experiment is the follow-
ing:
1 token = 0.15 Euros (that is, 1 token = 15 Euro cents).
For example, 20 tokens = 3 Euro.
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Task 3
In this task, you will have 1 minute to work with sliders. This task, as the
previous ones, consists in positioning the sliders at the number 50. However,
at the beginning of this task you will have to decide the way that you want
to be paid, that is the way that we compute your earning.
If you choose piece-rate payment, then you will earn 1 token for each
slider positioned at the number 50.
If you choose the tournament payment, then your performance in this
task will be compared with the performance of the other members of your
group in task 2. If the amount of sliders positioned at the number 50 is larger
than that of the other members of your group, then you will receive 4 times
more tokens per slider than in the piece-rate payment, that is 4 tokens for
each slider positioned at the number 50. If in this task the number of sliders
positioned at the number 50 is less than that of any of the members in your
group in task 2, then you will earn 0 token. We will not inform you about
your performance in the tournament until the end of this phase. In case of a
tie, the winner will be chosen randomly by the computer.
If you are the person in your group with the highest number of sliders
positioned at the number 50, you will receive 4 tokens for each slider at the
number 50, otherwise you will earn 0 token.
The exchange rate in this phase of the experiment is the follow-
ing:
1 token = 0.15 Euros (that is, 1 token = 15 Euro cents).
For example, 20 tokens = 3 Euro.
Task 4
In this task you will not have to work with the sliders. Notwithstanding,
you can obtain some additional earning for the amount of sliders positioned
at the number 50 in task 1. You have to choose the way of payment that you
would like to be applied to compute your earnings in task 1. You can choose
the piece-rate payment or the tournament payment.
If this task, that is task 4, is chosen for payment in this phase of the
experiment, then your earnings will be the following. If you chose the piece-
rate payment, then you will earn 1 token for each slider positioned at the
number 50 in task 1.
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If you chose the tournament payment, then your earnings are determined
in relation to the performance of the other members in your group in task 1.
Each group in the room will be formed by 4 individuals, so you will be in a
group with 3 other persons in the room. If the amount of sliders positioned
at the number 50 in task 1 is larger than that of the other members of
your group, then you will receive 4 times more tokens than in the piece-rate
payment, that is, 4 tokens for each slider positioned at the number 50. If
the number of sliders positioned above the number 50 in task 1 is less than
that of any of the members of your group in task 1, then you will receive 0
token. Hence, if you choose the tournament payment and you are the one in
the group with the highest number of sliders positioned at the number 50,
then you will earn 4 tokens for each slider at the number 50, otherwise you
will earn 0 token.
In this task, you will see on the screen the amount of sliders that you
positioned at the number 50 in task 1 and next you will have to select the
way of payment.
The exchange rate in this phase of the experiment is the follow-
ing:
1 token = 0.15 Euros (that is, 1 token = 15 Euro cents).
For example, 20 tokens = 3 Euro.
Additional questions
If you answer the next questions correctly, you can earn extra payment.
These questions refer to your performance in the previous tasks, compared
to those of the other participants.
In task 1, with the piece-rate payment, what do you think your perfor-
mance was in relation to the other members in your group.
• The best
• The second best
• The third best
• The fourth
In task 2, with the tournament payment, what do you think your perfor-
mance was in relation to the other members in your group.
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• The best
• The second best
• The third best
• The fourth
For each correct answer, you will receive 7 tokens.
1 token = 0.15 Euros (that is, 1 token = 15 Euro cents).
Questionnaire
(The questionnaire contained questions about the sociodemographics of
the participants. The questionnaire is available upon request.)
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Appendix C. Online Appendix - Descriptive statistics
Appendix C.1. Share of zero contributions
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Figure C.3: Share of zero contributions in the treatments
Figure Appendix C.1 illustrates the proportion of participants in a
session contributing nothing for each payment treatment. We observe an
increase in the share of participants with zero effort in time in both treat-
ments, but the increase is clearly more pronounced in the inverse proportional
treatment.
Appendix C.2. Correlations
The following correlation tables show the pairwise correlations between
our main variables. There is a negative and statistically significant correlation
between the average effort and the treatment, which indicates that individu-
als contribute less in terms of effort in the inverse proportional treatment of
the group contest and whose contributions are much lower at the end of the
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experimental task (-0.502*** for Round 16-20) rather than at its beginning
(-0.435*** for Round 1-5).
We also observe, that there is a strong positive correlation between in-
dividual’s risk attitudes and the competitiveness showing that individuals
with risk acceptant preferences compete more. Moreover, there is a positive
correlation between individuals contributions in terms of effort in the group
contest game and in the Public Good Game, such that those individuals who
put more effort in the Group contest, either at the beginning (Round 1-5)
or at the end of the task ( Round 16-20), are more cooperative in the Public
Goods Game.
Variables Average Effort Treatment Prosocial Risk attitudes Contribution Competitiveness
(=1 if inverse prop.) (SVO) (BRET) (PGG) (=1 if competitive)
Average Effort 1.000
Treatment -0.435*** 1.000
(=1 if inverse prop.) (0.000)
Prosocial(SVO) 0.013 0.018 1.000
(0.894) (0.852)
Risk attitudes (BRET) 0.048 -0.065 0.016 1.000
(0.619) (0.497) (0.864)
Contribution (PGG) 0.248* -0.318*** -0.149 0.169 1.000
(0.008) (0.001) (0.117) (0.074)
Competitiveness -0.056 0.071 -0.019 0.271** 0.112 1.000
(=1 if competitive) (0.558) (0.454) (0.846) (0.004) (0.240)
Table C.4: Pairwise correlations between behavior in the group contest, treatment and
the subsequent games and tasks. Round 1-5)
Variables Average Effort Treatment Prosocial Risk attitudes Contribution Competitiveness
(SVO) (BRET) (PGG) (=1 if competitive)
Average Effort 1.000
Treatment -0.502*** 1.000
(=1 if inverse prop.) (0.000)
Prosocial(SVO) -0.096 0.018 1.000
(0.312) (0.852)
Risk attitudes (BRET) 0.112 -0.065 0.016 1.000
(0.239) (0.497) (0.864)
Contribution (PGG) 0.473*** -0.318*** -0.149 0.169 1.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.117) (0.074)
Competitiveness -0.114 0.071 -0.019 0.271** 0.112 1.000
(=1 if competitive) (0.230) (0.454) (0.846) (0.004) (0.240)
Table C.5: Pairwise correlations between behavior in the group contest, treatment and
the subsequent games and tasks. Round 16-20)
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Appendix D. Online Appendix - Regressions per treatment
Here we consider very similar specifications to those in section 5.2, the
main difference being that here we carry them out separately for the different
treatments. First, we do this analysis for the egalitarian treatment and then
for the inverse proportional treatment.
Table D.6: Effort (Linear model: Egalitarian tr.)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6
Prosocial(SVO) 14.538 18.886 21.142 1.064 6.994 -22.301
(53.250) (52.039) (56.693) (54.433) (54.024) (70.179)
Risk preferences (Bomb task) 2.272 2.513 3.641∗ 2.658 1.474 1.874
(1.912) (1.866) (1.886) (1.910) (1.934) (2.222)
Contribution (PGG) 0.214∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.130 0.208∗∗ 0.206∗ 0.180
(0.098) (0.096) (0.104) (0.098) (0.105) (0.122)
Competitiveness (Niederle et. al. 2007) -90.686 -92.320∗ -42.011 -83.069 -83.490 -49.753
(56.533) (55.162) (57.168) (55.848) (58.801) (65.763)
Period -4.737∗∗∗ -4.734∗∗∗ -4.737∗∗∗ -4.728∗∗∗ -4.723∗∗∗
(1.201) (1.200) (1.201) (1.199) (1.198)
Group’s total effort (t-1) 0.045∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Rival group’s total effort (t-1) 0.035∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.039∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Socio-demographics (9 var.s) NO NO YES NO NO YES
Linguistic and cogn. ability (3 var.s) NO NO NO YES NO YES
Personality traits (7 var.s) NO NO NO NO YES YES
Constant 183.955∗ 126.035 -512.636 66.296 767.594∗ 819.887
(97.639) (100.110) (814.750) (141.081) (413.176) (1255.076)
Observations 1120 1064 1064 1064 1064 1064
Standard errors in parentheses. Random Effects Panel Linear Model. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Similarly to the regression in Table 3 prosociality proxied by social value
orientation does not correlate with effort in the egalitarian treatment. Risk
attitudes have the same effect as in the regression in Table 3. Interestingly,
the effect of cooperativeness as captured by contribution in the public goods
game is considerably lower in the egalitarian treatment than in Table 3.
Competitiveness exhibits a consistent negative effect that is marginally sig-
nificant in one specification, indicating that competitive individuals tend to
make less effort in the egalitarian treatment. The effect of period, group’s
total effort, rival group’s total effort is very similar to what we have seen in
Table 3.
As in the egalitarian treatment and overall, prosociality does not associate
with effort made in the group contest in the inverse proportional treatment.
The effect of risk attitudes vanishes as in this treatment we do not observe
a consistent positive (and sometimes significant) effect of risk tolerance on
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Table D.7: Effort(Linear model: Inverse payment tr.)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6
Prosocial(SVO) -6.262 0.263 -4.784 2.640 -5.371 -6.752
(24.061) (19.804) (21.052) (21.104) (24.030) (29.834)
Risk preferences (Bomb task) -0.623 -0.310 -0.070 -0.393 0.115 0.239
(0.781) (0.642) (0.672) (0.682) (0.734) (0.811)
Contribution (PGG) 0.168∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.166∗∗
(0.070) (0.057) (0.066) (0.060) (0.064) (0.083)
Competitiveness (Niederle et. al. 2007) 14.812 17.208 -6.470 19.604 29.428 8.763
(23.542) (19.311) (21.626) (20.391) (22.383) (27.011)
Period -2.731∗∗∗ -2.772∗∗∗ -2.761∗∗∗ -2.878∗∗∗ -2.873∗∗∗
(0.829) (0.831) (0.830) (0.831) (0.834)
Group’s total effort (t-1) 0.055∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Rival group’s total effort (t-1) 0.053∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Socio-demographics (9 var.s) NO NO YES NO NO YES
Linguistic and cogn. ability (3 var.s) NO NO NO YES NO YES
Personality traits (7 var.s) NO NO NO NO YES YES
Constant 114.791∗∗∗ 71.792∗∗ -314.673 68.252 -7.698 -390.727
(37.604) (35.592) (329.742) (58.003) (170.420) (454.581)
Observations 1120 1064 1064 1064 1064 1064
Standard errors in parentheses. Random Effect Panel Linear Model. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
the effort made. However, the effect of cooperativeness is very strong in this
treatment, while competitiveness fails to exhibit a consistent pattern. Period
has a significant negative effect, but the coefficient is considerably lower in
this treatment than on the egalitarian treatment. This may be due to the
fact that effort starts out at a lower level so it cannot decline as fast as in
the egalitarian treatment. Group’s total effort and rival group’s total effort
has a similar effect as in the egalitarian treatment and overall.
Appendix E. Online Appendix - Complete regressions
In this section we report the complete regressions so that the coefficients
of all variables used can be appreciated.
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Table E.8: Effort (Linear model)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 est7 est8
Treatment (Inverse vs. egalit.) -207.470∗∗∗ -174.360∗∗∗ -115.141∗∗∗ -45.286 -113.833∗∗∗ -109.147∗∗∗ -103.638∗∗∗ -51.748
(29.096) (29.998) (30.357) (101.882) (31.686) (30.995) (30.481) (109.019)
Prosocial(SVO) -7.978 -3.751 19.190 0.348 -5.331 -12.736 15.118
(28.583) (27.089) (39.255) (29.467) (27.502) (28.328) (47.553)
Risk pref.s (Bomb task) 0.556 0.805 2.508∗ 1.061 0.754 0.505 1.904
(0.979) (0.927) (1.407) (0.954) (0.937) (0.947) (1.582)
Contribution (PGG) 0.195∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗
(0.064) (0.061) (0.072) (0.064) (0.062) (0.064) (0.083)
Competitiveness (Niederle et. al. 2007) -31.252 -30.550 -92.325∗∗ -8.735 -26.776 -34.127 -56.054
(29.623) (28.020) (41.599) (30.328) (28.516) (28.798) (46.615)
Period -4.005∗∗∗ -4.736∗∗∗ -3.990∗∗∗ -4.009∗∗∗ -3.991∗∗∗ -4.725∗∗∗
(0.729) (0.985) (0.729) (0.729) (0.728) (0.984)
Group’s tot. effor (t-1) 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Rival’s group tot. effor (t-1) 0.038∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Tr.*Prosocial -19.905 -26.863
(56.213) (64.850)
Tr.*Risk pref.s -2.842 -1.992
(1.919) (2.120)
Tr.*Contibution -0.052 -0.075
(0.137) (0.150)
Tr.*Competitiveness 109.603∗ 83.816
(57.229) (62.676)
Tr.*Period 1.759 1.776
(1.526) (1.525)
Tr.*Group’s effort 0.001 0.003
(0.023) (0.023)
Tr.*Rival’s group effort 0.017 0.016
(0.023) (0.023)
Female 16.890 14.427
(31.511) (35.932)
Age -0.087 0.418
(2.069) (2.425)
Body Mass Index -1.008 -1.680
(0.991) (1.158)
Academ. degree 13.013 8.881
(17.822) (21.765)
2-4(left hand) 306.485 75.144
(404.384) (443.898)
Breadwinner 56.093∗ 48.261
(30.232) (32.961)
Breadwin.’s employm. -1.948 -8.978
(15.968) (17.419)
Num. siblings -20.335∗ -14.601
(10.908) (12.523)
Work (hrs/week) -0.494 4.723
(9.060) (9.806)
Reflective 18.838 8.143
(42.316) (48.684)
(Ir)reflective 45.997 13.711
(34.983) (41.523)
Num. of lang.s 5.066 -1.371
(19.888) (22.876)
Agreeableness -21.062 -20.733
(12.902) (15.979)
Conscientiousness -20.334∗ -25.617∗
(11.719) (13.410)
Extraversion -18.024 -8.579
(16.270) (18.568)
Neuroticism 19.107∗ 10.614
(10.360) (11.255)
Openness -8.603 -1.424
(13.347) (14.800)
Happiness (degree) 7.701 24.259
(25.054) (28.904)
Self esteem -5.406 -2.858
(4.060) (4.798)
Constant 332.305∗∗∗ 255.457∗∗∗ 182.981∗∗∗ 125.841∗ -166.340 138.749∗ 522.524∗∗ 312.247
(20.574) (52.736) (54.789) (76.141) (436.257) (79.504) (214.301) (581.125)
Observations 2240 2240 2128 2128 2128 2128 2128 2128
Standard errors in parentheses. Random Effect Panel Linear Model. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table E.9: Effort (Linear model: Egalitarian tr.)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6
Prosocial(SVO) 14.538 18.886 21.142 1.064 6.994 -22.301
(53.250) (52.039) (56.693) (54.433) (54.024) (70.179)
Risk pref.s (Bomb task) 2.272 2.513 3.641∗ 2.658 1.474 1.874
(1.912) (1.866) (1.886) (1.910) (1.934) (2.222)
Contribution (PGG) 0.214∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.130 0.208∗∗ 0.206∗ 0.180
(0.098) (0.096) (0.104) (0.098) (0.105) (0.122)
Competitiveness (Niederle et. al. 2007) -90.686 -92.320∗ -42.011 -83.069 -83.490 -49.753
(56.533) (55.162) (57.168) (55.848) (58.801) (65.763)
Period -4.737∗∗∗ -4.734∗∗∗ -4.737∗∗∗ -4.728∗∗∗ -4.723∗∗∗
(1.201) (1.200) (1.201) (1.199) (1.198)
Group’s tot. effor (t-1) 0.045∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Rival’s group tot. effor (t-1) 0.035∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.039∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Female 3.336 5.909
(60.957) (83.293)
Age 4.281 1.702
(3.823) (4.828)
Body Mass Index -1.481 -3.141
(1.671) (2.001)
Academ. degree 31.006 36.416
(36.645) (47.001)
2-4(left hand) 314.875 -128.833
(714.065) (829.690)
Breadwinner 154.756∗∗ 127.390
(76.436) (96.664)
Breadwin.’s employm. -1.382 11.502
(31.060) (36.950)
Num. siblings -55.958∗∗∗ -32.617
(21.652) (25.538)
Work (hrs/week) 6.813 19.659
(17.916) (19.567)
Reflective 77.050 -94.639
(90.133) (118.715)
(Ir)reflective 129.926 -62.796
(79.225) (125.344)
Num. of lang.s -15.785 -21.842
(37.258) (43.325)
Agreeableness -40.063∗ -63.556∗
(24.154) (35.805)
Conscientiousness -27.729 -35.627
(22.416) (25.278)
Extraversion -15.859 2.564
(32.585) (35.424)
Neuroticism 38.515∗ 17.974
(22.264) (25.687)
Openness -4.896 -5.325
(28.250) (29.419)
Happiness (degree) -12.373 5.556
(52.517) (58.136)
Self esteem -15.432∗∗ -8.928
(7.539) (11.359)
Constant 183.955∗ 126.035 -512.636 66.296 767.594∗ 819.887
(97.639) (100.110) (814.750) (141.081) (413.176) (1255.076)
Observations 1120 1064 1064 1064 1064 1064
Standard errors in parentheses. Random Effect Panel Linear Model. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table E.10: Effort(Linear model: Inverse payment tr.)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6
Prosocial(SVO) -6.262 0.263 -4.784 2.640 -5.371 -6.752
(24.061) (19.804) (21.052) (21.104) (24.030) (29.834)
Risk pref.s (Bomb task) -0.623 -0.310 -0.070 -0.393 0.115 0.239
(0.781) (0.642) (0.672) (0.682) (0.734) (0.811)
Contribution (PGG) 0.168∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.166∗∗
(0.070) (0.057) (0.066) (0.060) (0.064) (0.083)
Competitiveness (Niederle et. al. 2007) 14.812 17.208 -6.470 19.604 29.428 8.763
(23.542) (19.311) (21.626) (20.391) (22.383) (27.011)
Period -2.731∗∗∗ -2.772∗∗∗ -2.761∗∗∗ -2.878∗∗∗ -2.873∗∗∗
(0.829) (0.831) (0.830) (0.831) (0.834)
Group’s tot. effor (t-1) 0.055∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Rival’s group tot. effor (t-1) 0.053∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Female -11.143 -5.526
(21.821) (25.951)
Age -1.179 -0.093
(1.814) (2.280)
Body Mass Index 2.538∗∗∗ 3.046∗∗∗
(0.939) (1.161)
Academ. degree 6.488 -4.374
(14.759) (19.799)
2-4(left hand) 216.367 182.446
(310.559) (369.976)
Breadwinner -4.944 -10.281
(18.708) (23.355)
Breadwin.’s employm. -0.244 2.899
(11.326) (14.648)
Num. siblings 19.924∗∗ 18.093∗
(8.049) (9.698)
Work (hrs/week) 0.962 3.984
(6.517) (8.443)
Reflective 18.034 7.521
(29.032) (36.703)
(Ir)reflective 4.395 16.094
(23.065) (26.999)
Num. of lang.s -0.586 -6.896
(16.379) (19.332)
Agreeableness 7.938 10.424
(10.681) (12.793)
Conscientiousness -14.047 -5.606
(10.062) (12.207)
Extraversion -10.059 -17.212
(13.436) (17.036)
Neuroticism 0.180 3.644
(7.165) (7.728)
Openness 1.411 -3.687
(9.890) (11.951)
Happiness (degree) 23.645 27.409
(19.777) (22.953)
Self esteem 3.546 2.349
(3.109) (3.777)
Constant 114.791∗∗∗ 71.792∗∗ -314.673 68.252 -7.698 -390.727
(37.604) (35.592) (329.742) (58.003) (170.420) (454.581)
Observations 1120 1064 1064 1064 1064 1064
Standard errors in parentheses. Random Effect Panel Linear Model. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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